Strike Force Interoperability Officer (SFIO) Program
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By Commander Matthew Carroll, USN
Preparing a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or an
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) for deployment is a
complex undertaking from a program level perspective.
Regardless of complexity, successful preparation is
traditionally bound by three elements: time, cost, and
quality. The ship’s deployment cycle defines the time
period of maintenance and modernization to meet the
ship’s objective as delineated by the government. The cost
is the component represented not only by the fiscal cost of
modernization but also by the personnel costs associated
with both those onboard and those in supporting
functions ashore to train and certify the group. With
regard to the quality of the group, it is more than
the sum of the individual ship’s capabilities; it is
the ability of those ships and aircraft to operate
as a cohesive team, i.e., to be interoperable.
Dating back to the late 1990s, technology advances
in Command and Control, Communications, Computers,
Combat Systems, and Intelligence (C5I) capability,
coupled with the need to become more interoperable,
significantly impacted the surface force C5I
modernization process. Although several capability
gains were realized, a number of crippling deficiencies
emerged as well at both the Strike Group and individual
unit level. These increasingly complex and interdependent
systems were developed and installed quickly
as the Navy focused primarily on delivering enhanced
capability to support commander’s missions and
objectives. Complicating this process was the decision
to transition from proprietary, government-designed
equipment to commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware
and operating systems. Consequently, developmental
shore-based testing of these new commercially
procured capabilities did not afford adequate
time nor did it represent the shipboard environment
in which they were to operate. Some of the most
noteworthy consequences of rapid fielding included
an Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) failure of the
Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS) Block
1, the loss of an entire deployment cycle for a number
of Aegis Cruisers due to a new Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) installation, and an additional
Aegis Cruiser failing 
an
operational test of the
Advanced Tomahawk
Weapon Control System
(ATWCS). These failures
resulted in system reliability
falling well below
design specifications for
proper operation and
employment.
Although the U.S.
Navy enjoyed the reputation
of having the most
modern and capable fleet
of ships in the world, they
were unable to effectively
work together. The introduction
of more complex
combat systems that now relied on the networking of
systems to achieve greater capability exposed a flaw.
The realization was that ships working together in
a battle group may not be able to operate as a team.
Shortly after these deficiencies received national
media attention in 19981 the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) charged Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) with the central responsibility to address
battle management and C5I systems interoperability
problems within the Systems Commands (SYSCOMs)
and Program Executive Offices (PEOs). Specific tenets
of this responsibility included the implementation of
the following: a common warfare system engineering
and certification process; a codified process for
defining, controlling, and certifying C5I configurations;
interoperability milestones; and earlier testing
of future systems with a more capable shore-based
testing network. The goal was to deliver deploying
assets capable of the highest warfighting readiness
absent the distractions resulting from interoperability
failures.
Striving for continuous improvement in warfighting
readiness makes system modernization necessary
for a number of reasons including being able
to respond to a newly developed threat such as the
development of the Close-In Weapons System (CIWS)
Block 1B surface mode to defeat small boat attacks,
upgrading a weapon seeker head upgrade to counter
an adversary’s new anti-ship missile, maintaining
technological superiority over an adversary and
thereby enhancing national sea power, and overcoming
obsolescence and expensive in service costssuch
as the COTS refresh of the Aegis hardware.
Additionally, modernization processes are sometimes
required to overcome deficiencies of fielded systems
that were not apparent during initial test and evaluation
activities. These changes vary greatly in their
complexity and urgency and are more prevalent in
software; but hardware can be impacted as well. The
result is a variety of requirements managed by multiple
organizations–
each with its own asynchronous
timeline, resource constraints, and quality standards.
Few of these requirements align easily to the Fleet
Readiness and Training Plan. Each misalignment
results in risk to the quality of the deploying group
and ultimately mission success.
Although good policy, tight regulation, and robust
certification applied to interoperability using sound
systems engineering processes have been in place over
the past 16 years to rectify the discrepancies, problems
still exist. A lack of organizational ownership over
the entire kill chain and the slow pace of rectification
efforts for interoperability issues identified in test
and evaluation activities were areas that demanded
immediate focus. Through the observations of NAVSEA’s
SFIO team, broad communication between the
Fleet and the technical community can significantly
improve modernization and interoperability issues
described above. It is in this arena that the SFIO team
efforts help to coordinate modernization actions and
provide a valuable service to the Fleet.
The SFIO team, with officers on each coast and
overseas, is the primary interface for the warfighter.
They assist with early identification of interoperability
issues and advocate for prompt resolution within the
technical community. The SFIO team helps warfighters
identify and track their issues (or risks) throughout
the cycle and provides ongoing support while
deployed.
Consisting of uniformed officers and project engineers
located in major fleet concentration areas, the
SFIO team is a small, but effective resource for the
warfighter. The team is managed under Combat Systems
Direction Activity (CDSA), an Echelon V command
under Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren
Division (NSWCDD). Since 2000, this fleet support
effort has crossed SYSCOM boundaries and involved
regular coordination with PEOs, Type Commanders
(TYCOMs), Numbered Fleet Commanders (NFCs),
SYSCOM program offices, In-Service Engineering
Agents (ISEAs), Software Support Activities (SSAs),
Alteration Installation Teams (AITs), Regional Maintenance
Centers (RMCs), Class Squadrons (CLASSRONs),
Program Managers’ Representatives (PMRs),
and others. The SFIO’s primary customer is the CSG,
ARG/MEU staff N6 or appropriate leadership on
independent deployers.
Figure 1 illustrates the cycle of interaction with the
Fleet at key periods in the Fleet Response Plan (FRP).
Commencing with a C5I status brief delivered prior
to planned modernization availabilities, the SFIO
team highlights planned capability improvements and
identifies potential interoperability and modernization
issues for all ships and warfare areas.
The SFIO executes update briefings with ship representatives
throughout the FRP and maintains contact
with key staff to facilitate emergent issue resolution.
Sometimes the fleet interaction role is as simple as
assisting a ship with a troublesome equipment casualty
by providing the support network contacts, or as
complex as influencing the fielding plan for a carrier
availability. The latter was achieved recently for the
one of the CSGs where the carrier was scheduled to
deploy without the Accelerated Midterm Interoperability
Improvement Program (AMIIP) upgrades. The
upgrade consisted of a series of software updates to
the host combat system and other interdependent
systems that allow for improved coordinated tactical
picture compilation. The improvements are often best
described as an “all or nothing” upgrade.
Synchronization of program test, certification, and
fielding plans allowed completion of this important
upgrade on the cruiser and all of the destroyers in
the deploying group. Each responsible organization
worked its individual program’s resources, testing,
and fielding plans with good systems engineering to
meet the policy guidelines for each platform of system
within their purview. When viewed holistically, it
became apparent that raising the priority on the carrier
would result in a vastly improved capability to
the warfighter during the upcoming deployment. The
SFIO team successfully advocated for the change to
go ahead on behalf of the strike group and thereby
improved the probability of mission success.
Interoperability issues pose a potential risk to the
quality of the deploying group. By acknowledging
the risks, the Navy can assess, track, and manage
interoperability using traditional treatment methods.
Treating risk through elimination, i.e., including
AMIIP on the carrier, removes the possibility
of mission failure by eliminating the risk of a poor
tactical picture.
Management of interoperability risks across C5I
systems requires a range of traditional risk control
measures. Examples of these controls include: “substitution”
as an appropriate control for a software
installation that is rolled back to a previous version
following discovery of significant issues post roll-out,
and “engineering” as an appropriate control which
might entail a minor software change to a host combat
system software that prevents certain Variable Action
Button action from placing the combat system into
an unsafe mode. This is not an ideal treatment, but
suitable, most times, as an interim measure. When
changes to hardware or software cannot be implemented
immediately, due to schedule or budget constraints,
“administrative” and “behavioral” controls
are put in place in the form of Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures (TTPs).
TTPs or workarounds for a system limitation are
at best, temporarily effective; the ultimate goal should
be to design out the problem. Unfortunately, in the
real world we are constrained by resources and must
determine if the investment to achieve such a solution
is warranted. Often, training people in the techniques
to limit the impact of the interoperability issue and
provide an awareness and education to the operational
commander and the team is the most cost effective
solution.
Another significant factor in the treatment of
interoperability risks is an understanding of the
context in which the risk may present itself. The
Strike Group Interoperability Capabilities and Limitations
(SGI C&L) team, managed out of NSWC Port
Hueneme, maintains a database of the known issues
for each unit and potential strike group combination.
This data is a valuable resource to the warfare commander
in managing the risk that interoperability
poses on deployment. Being at sea on an operational
deployment creates a dynamic environment, and the
commander continually evaluates the mission risk
based on changing operational circumstances. Consequently,
the interoperability risk must constantly
be re-evaluated and the strike group optimized to
manage that risk. This is particularly relevant when
the composition of the strike group changes during
the deployment as a result of the incorporation of an
independent deployer or loss of a unit due to a significant
defect. In addition to the SGI C&L database,
for timely analysis, the ability to reach back to the
shore support organizations is an important service
provided by the SFIO team. With links and a wide
network of relationships across SYSCOMs and PEOs,
the team can help the Fleet “connect the dots” on
interoperability or support issues that might otherwise
distract the deployed Sailor from the mission.
The ultimate goal of course, is to mitigate the impact
of interoperability issues and risks to shorten the
feedback loop between the fleet and the technical
communities. This dynamic knowledge gathering and
analysis becomes even more important as the continual
constrained fiscal environment forces heavier
reliance on integrated joint and coalition groups.
So where do we stand today? The message from
the CNO in 1998 charged NAVSEA with the central
responsibility for coordinating the resolution of C5I
interoperability problems within the Fleet. Despite
the establishment of robust policy and regulation
that was imposed on the acquisition community to
consider the interoperability of C5I systems during
system design and integration, problems still persist.
Perhaps the greatest achievement since the 1990s is
the acknowledgment of the complex integrated fleet
and the need to manage rather than solve interoperability.
The dynamic operational environment in
which the Navy is required to raise, train, and sustain
surface strike groups around the world will always
result in capability gaps and incompatibilities. The
goal of the SFIO team is to educate, mitigate, and
advocate for the best possible outcome that reduces
the interoperability risk for the warfighter in a way
that provides a value-added service to the Fleet and
respects the fiscal and programmatic challenges the
technical community faces.