

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division

AMERICA'S FLEET STARTS HERE



Day 2 - New Employee Onboarding

Captain Todd E. Hutchison
Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Human Resources Division

Larry Tarasek
Technical Director, NSWCCD

Welcome Back



Welcome Back!

Sign-in / Review Agenda



WELCOME TO CARDEROCK!



Access your onboarding presentation slides on the Carderock New Hires Page:

<https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/Warfare-Centers/NSWC-Carderock/Career-Opportunities/Forms-for-New-Hires>

Once you have obtained your CAC, from your government device, use the link below to access more useful onboarding materials (CAC required):

<https://wiki.navsea.navy.mil/display/WDP/Employee+Onboarding+Program>



Agenda Day 2 Onboarding

Agenda

Welcome Back!

- 0845 - [Welcome & Sign-in](#)
- 0900 - [Mandatory Antiterrorism Level I and Active Shooter Trainings](#)
- 0930 - [Workforce Development / Professional Development Training Request Process](#)
- 1010 - [Break 1](#)
- 1020 - [Military Protocol Brief](#)
- 1050 - [Command Evaluation & Review Brief](#)
- 1100 - [Lunch](#)
- 1200 - [Mandatory Initial Security Orientation and Indoctrination Brief](#)
- 1230 - [Controlled Unclassified Information \(CUI\) Trainings](#) and [Mandatory Privacy & Personally Identifiable Info. \(PII\)](#)
- 1300 - [Break 2](#)
- 1310 - [Mandatory Operations Security \(OPSEC\), Physical Security and Insider Threat Trainings](#) (with Video)
- 1330 - [Purchase Card / Unauthorized Commitments \(UACs\)](#)
- 1400 - [Wrap-Up / Questions / Complete Survey](#)

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division

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DoD Level-1 Antiterrorism (AT) Training for New Hires

Captain Todd E. Hutchison
Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Code 1052 (Security Division)

Larry Tarasek
Technical Director, NSWCCD

Introduction


- Threat is a real and present danger
- Remain vigilant while executing responsibilities
- International terrorist network may be present where you serve
- Personal safety is important
 - Remain alert
 - Be aware of your surroundings
 - Report suspicious activity
 - Pay attention to antiterrorism briefings
 - Make security part of your routine
- Do not be a tempting target!

America's effort to fight terrorism includes everyone.



Force Protection Conditions

- US military facilities use protective measures organized in a system called Force Protection Conditions, or FPCONs.
- FPCONs are organized in five levels with increased protection at each level:
 - NORMAL
 - ALPHA
 - BRAVO
 - CHARLIE
 - DELTA.






As the threat of attack changes, Commanders change the FPCON to protect personnel

FPCONs (cont.)

- NORMAL – Routine security posture (access controls)
- ALPHA – Increased threat (maintain indefinitely)
- BRAVO – Increased/predictable threat (operational effects)
- CHARLIE – Per intel, event likely (prolonged hardships)
- DELTA – Actual/imminent event (not for extended duration)

Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAM)

- Supplement FPCONs
- Countermeasure to hostile force observation
- HHQ approval
- Provides change to security atmosphere



Anticipate


- Anticipating threats, risks, and vulnerabilities is fundamental to antiterrorism and personal security.
- Ways to do this include:
 - Research criminal activity
 - Understand the tactics & techniques
 - Know types of targets and locations
- Consider consulting these sources:
 - Police crime reports
 - Other internet and media resources



Several sources allow you to research threats for yourself

Be Vigilant

- Vigilance is required to continuously observe your surroundings and recognize suspicious activities.
- Understand your environment's normal conditions.
- Knowledge of the normal amplifies abnormal activities.
 - Items that are out of place
 - Attempted surveillance
 - Circumstances that correspond to prior criminal activity in your area



Informed vigilance is fundamental to personal security

Don't Be a Target

- Blend in with your surroundings.
 - Do not wear clothing or carry items that attract criminal attention
 - Remain low key
 - Avoid high criminal locations
- Reduce your vulnerability and exposure:
 - Select places with security measures
 - Be unpredictable
 - Travel in a small group
 - Use automobiles and residences with adequate security features



DOD affiliation may identify you as a potential target

Report and Respond

- Report suspicious activities to appropriate authorities.
 - Report suspicious activity, do not try to deal with it yourself
 - In threatening situations, take steps to reduce your exposure
 - Follow the instructions of emergency personnel and first responders



(The Fort Dix attack plot was thwarted by an alert store clerk)

Security is a team effort

Active Shooter Intro

- An Active Shooter incident can occur any time, any place
 - September 2013 shooting at the Navy Yard
 - March 2011 shooting of Air Force personnel at Frankfurt Airport in Germany
 - November 2009 shooting at the Soldier Readiness Center in Fort Hood, Texas
 - June 2009 shooting at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C.
 - May 2009 shooting of soldiers outside a military recruitment center in Arkansas
 - 2007 plot to attack Fort Dix using automatic weapons
- From 2000 – 2018 / 277 incidents have occurred
 - 884 lives were lost / 1,546 were wounded



An incident can occur anywhere, even on your own installation

Active Shooter Fundamentals

- Responses to an Active Shooter include:
 - Run
 - If you can escape the area, do so without hesitation
 - Hide
 - If unable to escape, find a place to hide
 - Fight
 - As a last resort, and only if your life is in immediate danger, alone, or as a group, attempt to incapacitate the shooter.



Run, Hide, Fight

Responding to an Active Shooter

- Evacuate: If possible, be sure to:
 - If you can escape, do so without hesitation. Be aware that your evacuation point may be different than for fire evacuations.
 - Evacuate whether others agree to or not.
 - Leave your belongings behind.
 - Help others escape, if possible. Assist individuals with special needs or disabilities.
 - Attempt to rescue others or treat the injured only if you can do so without further endangering yourself or others.
 - Keep your hands visible as you flee.
 - Prevent others from entering the area, if possible.



Run



Active Shooter

- If unable to escape, find a place to hide.
- Your hiding place should:
 - Be out of the shooter's view.
 - Provide protection from shots fired (e.g., hide behind large items that afford protection).
 - Prevent shooter from entering (e.g., barricade the door with furniture).
- Silence cell phones/turn off any source of noise (e.g., radios).
- Remain quiet.
- Identify improvised weapons.



Hide

Active Shooter

- As a last resort, and only if your life is at immediate risk, together or alone, attempt to incapacitate the shooter.
 - Act as aggressively as possible against the shooter.
 - Throw items and improvised weapons.
 - Yell.
- Be committed to your actions until the threat is eliminated.



Fight


Arrival of First Responders

- When first responders arrive, support their efforts and do not be a distraction:
 - Officers will move directly to where last shots were heard.
 - Remain as calm as possible and follow Officer's instructions. You may be searched.
 - Avoid quick movements, do not point.
 - Put down items in your hands; raise hands and keep hands visible at all times.
 - Officers may shout commands and push individuals to the ground for their safety.
 - Do not attempt to hold onto Officers for safety.
 - Do not stop to ask Officers for help - proceed in the direction they have approached from.
 - Law Enforcement's mission upon arrival is to stop the shooter, rendering aid is secondary.



Cooperate with first responders and don't be a distraction





Questions

Direct any additional concerns and comments to:

Homer Renshaw – AT Program Manager

homer.renshaw@navy.mil

301-227-1287

Benjamin Lee – Branch Head

Benjamin.d.lee1@navy.mil

301-227-1170



Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division

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Workforce Development Branch

Captain Todd E. Hutchison
Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Code 1016

Larry Tarasek
Technical Director, NSWCCD



Workforce Development Branch

Goal: *“Developing Today’s Workforce to Face Tomorrow’s Challenges”*

- Provide high quality, timely and relevant employee development programs that enhance individual knowledge, skills and abilities.
- Develop employees that have the skills that allows the division to meet our customers needs.
- Provide programs that develop a well-rounded employee.



On-Site Training

Open to all employees

Wide range of topics

- Technical/Professional Development
- Employee Development
- Leadership, Supervisory



Online Course Catalog, All Hands Emails

Navy Enterprise Resource Program (ERP)

- Employee, Admin Officer or Training Coordinator enters
- Must be approved by Supervisor
- Paid by Department (generally)
- Approved by Workforce Development
- Navy ERP Link: <https://ep.erp.navy.mil/irj/portal>



Off-Site Training

Specific Technical or Professional Training required for position

Individual researches vendors & coordinates with Workforce Development staff

Entered and approved through Navy ERP



Training Rules

Must be entered into Navy ERP NLT three weeks prior to class start date

- Enter as soon as possible
- Let us know of any special requirements or payments

Do NOT attend training until fully approved

- Workforce Development is final approval

No-show – Department still pays

Provide proof of training completion

Purchase Card holders for Training/Conferences:

Olamidayo Odusanya

Renard Walker

Cecelia Paulding

Jeffrey Klimczak



TOTAL WORKFORCE MANAGEMENT SERVICES (TWMS)

- **TWMS is the location to complete all non-safety related mandatory training.**
- **Training is announced via All Hands email and once the training is completed, TWMS automatically records completion.**
- **To access TWMS, employee must have a Common Access Card (CAC)**
- **<https://twms.dc3n.navy.mil/>**

Total Workforce Management Services (TWMS)

Workforce Manager 2.0 //

**** FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY ACT SENSITIVE ****

** Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure of this information may result in both civil and criminal penalties **

- NAVIGATION:**
- HOME
 - Login/Logout
- Information:**
- Contact Us
 - Data Update Status
 - Employee Locator
 - Documentation & Training - New**
 - TWMS Updates
 - Privacy Act Statement

Log into TWMS Workforce Manager

SELECT PROFILE:

[Click here for an Account Application](#)

[Click Here for Self-Service/myTWMS \(Access your own record only\)](#)

[Click Here to access TWMS Employee Locator](#)



DoD Disclaimer

You are accessing a U.S. Government(USG) information system (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only.

By using this IS, you consent to the following conditions:

- The USG routinely monitors communications occurring on this IS, and any device attached to this IS, for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network defense, quality control, and employee misconduct, law enforcement, and counterintelligence investigations.
- At any time, the USG may inspect and/or seize data stored on this IS and any device attached to this IS.
- Communications occurring on or data stored on this IS, or any device attached to this IS, are not private. They are subject to routine monitoring and search.
- Any communications occurring on or data stored on this IS, or any device attached to this IS, may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose.
- Security protections may be utilized on this IS to protect certain interests that are important to the USG. For example, passwords, access cards, encryption or biometric access controls provide security for the benefit of the USG. These protections are not provided for your benefit or privacy and maybe modified or eliminated at the USG's discretion.

More Information

- **CARDEROCKDIVINST 12410.13C – Civilian Training, Education, and Career Development**
- **Carderock Intranet - New Hire Bridge**
- **Call or email the Workforce Development Branch**
 - West Bethesda
 - Jorge Galindo, Branch Head
 - Linda Florian
 - Olamidayo Odusanya (Diana)
 - Cecelia Paulding (CeCe)
 - Renard Walker
 - Jeffrey Klimczak



Break 1

Break - 1



Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division

AMERICA'S FLEET STARTS HERE



NAVY AND MILITARY PROTOCOL

Captain Todd E. Hutchison
Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Veteran Employee Resource Group

Larry Tarasek
Technical Director, NSWCCD

- **Department of Navy (DoN) Civilians**
- **Military Personnel**
- **Addressing Military Personnel**
- **Navy Terminology**
- **Riding a Ship**
- **Some Basic Navy Customs**

Life as a DoN Civilian



Maneuvering and Seakeeping Basin
(MASK) Bldg. 18

Working as a DoN civilian places you in a different culture from a standard position in private industry.

Generally, you will work with and for civilians, but there are some differences between our work environment and private industry you should know...

- Carderock's chief executive is a Navy Captain
- You may have opportunities to work directly with military officers and enlisted personnel
- Many of our processes are based on military instructions, regulations or practices
- Military names and acronyms pervade our work vocabulary
- When working on ships, there is an expectation that civilians know some basic things about ship life, terms and customs
- The military traditions and ceremonies are very powerful and motivating - civilians are expected to be familiar with them



Three Categories of Military Personnel



- **Officers** – Are commissioned by the President and are highly educated, specially trained military leaders who manage the Navy's personnel, ships, aircraft, and weapons systems.
- **Warrant Officers** – Specialists in their fields who are selected for positions between the ranks of officer and enlisted personnel (US Air Force does not have these)
- **Enlisted** – Those who enlist in the service as non-officers and who perform the numerous specialized tasks that accomplish the mission

Officers

Officers are generalists trained to make decisions and lead organizations of various levels of responsibility and complexity.

In the Navy

- O-1 through O-4 are junior grade officers
- O-5 through O-6 are senior grade officers
- O-7 through O-10 are flag officers

In the Marines

- O-1 through O-3 are company grade officers
- O-4 through O-6 are field grade officers
- O-7 through O-10 are general officers

In the civilian leadership structure of the United States military, the Marine Corps is a component of the United States Department of the Navy (DoN).

In the military leadership structure, the Marine Corps is a separate branch.



Navy and Marine Corps Officer Titles

In the Navy

- O-1 Ensign (ENS)
- O-2 Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG)
- O-3 Lieutenant (LT)
- O-4 Lieutenant Commander (LCDR)
- O-5 Commander (CDR)
- O-6 Captain (CAPT)
- O-7 Rear Admiral Lower Half (RDML) – 1 star
- O-8 Rear Admiral Upper Half (RADM) – 2 star
- O-9 Vice Admiral (VADM) – 3 star
- O-10 Admiral (ADM) – 4 star
- None – Fleet Admiral (Wartime Only)

In the Marine Corps

- O-1 2ND Lieutenant (2nd Lt.)
- O-2 First Lieutenant (1st Lt.)
- O-3 Captain (Capt.)
- O-4 Major (Maj.)
- O-5 Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.)
- O-6 Colonel (Col.)
- O-7 Brigadier General ((Brig. Gen.)
- O-8 Major General (Maj. Gen.)
- O-9 Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen.)
- O-10 General (Gen.)

For a complete chart of officer ranks & insignia, visit
<https://www.defense.gov/Resources/Insignia/#officer-insignia/>

How to Interact with Senior Officers

When you interact with senior and flag officers, observe the following protocols:



- Stand when Flag Officers and Commanding Officers (CO) enter a room, especially when they are announced with “Officer on Deck!”.
- As a civilian, you do not need to salute.
- Officers and CO’s avoid fraternization with enlisted sailors and soldiers – civilians may move easily between both groups
- If you are uncertain of the officer’s rank, use sir or ma’am
- Use the military terms when discussing dates, time or ship terminology
- Adhere to strict standards of timeliness. You should be 5 minutes early when possible.
- Dress appropriately if you are meeting with them. The civilian equivalent of the camouflage and “class B” uniform (see pic) is business casual and for “class A” is a suit and tie.



Navy Enlisted Titles

In the Navy

- E1 – Seaman Recruit
- E2 – Seaman Apprentice
- E3 – Seaman
- E4 – Petty Officer 3rd Class
- E5 – Petty Officer 2nd Class
- E6 – Petty Officer 1st Class
- E7 – Chief Petty Officer
- E8 – Senior Chief Petty Officer
- E9 – Master Chief Petty Officer or
- E9 – Fleet or Command Master Chief Petty Officer
- E9 – Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy



Can be addressed as Petty Officer or by their rate. E.g., OS1 for an Operational Specialist First Class Petty Officer.

Can be addressed as Chief, Senior Chief or Master Chief or by their rate. E.g., ETCS for an Electronics Technician Senior Chief.

Rate – The pay grade a person works in

Rating – The specialized field the person trains in or works in

Enlisted Navy personnel do not have a rank, only naval officers do

For a complete chart of enlisted ranks & insignia, visit

<https://www.defense.gov/Resources/Insignia/#enlisted-insignia>



USMC Enlisted Titles

In the Marine Corps

- E1 – Private
- E2 – Private First Class
- E3 – Lance Corporal
- E4 – Corporal
- E5 – Sergeant
- E6 – Staff Sergeant
- E7 – Gunnery Sergeant
- E8 – Master Sergeant or First Sergeant
- E9 – Sergeant Major
- E9 – Master Gunnery Sergeant
- E9 – Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps



Rate – The pay grade a person works in

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) – The specialized field the person trains in or works in (very similar to Navy Rating)

Non-Commissioned Officers

Navy Petty Officers and USMC Corporals and Sergeants are considered Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), which are E4 and higher

Junior NCOs (E4s) function as first tier supervisors and technical leaders

NCOs serving in the top three enlisted grades (E-7, E-8, and E-9) are termed senior NCOs

- Chief Petty Officers in the Navy (and Coast Guard)
- Expected to exercise leadership at a more general level
- Lead larger groups of service members
- Mentor junior officers, and advise senior officers on matters pertaining to their areas of responsibility
- Marine Corps senior NCOs are referred to as Staff NCOs
- A select few senior NCOs serve at the highest levels of their service, advising their service Secretary and Chief of Staff on all matters pertaining to the well-being and utilization of the enlisted force

Navy Terminology

Here are some terms you will want to be familiar with. Many were derived from hundreds of years of naval operations across the globe.

Hull – The outside part of the ship that rides in or above the water line but below the main deck

Bow or Fore – Forward most part of the hull

Aft or Fantail – Back most part of the hull

Keel – The foundation of the ship, it is the very bottom most part of the hull and it usually forms a V or U shape

Stem – The forward most end of the keel

Stern – The after most end of the keel to which the rudder is usually attached

Bulkheads – The walls in the interior of the ship that divide it into compartments

Decks – Floors of the ship

Portholes – Windows of the ship



USS Constitution – “Old Ironsides”

Navy Terminology (continued)

Gangway – Walkway between the shore and the ship used for crew and passengers to board or leave

Go Aloft – Climb up ladders to go to higher decks in the ship

Go Below – Climb down ladders to get to lower decks.

Passageway – Essentially a walkway or hallway leading to other compartments.

Quarterdeck – Not actually a deck, but a designated compartment where official business and operations of the ship are carried out.

Starboard Side – Right hand side of the ship (looking towards the bow)

Port Side – Left hand side of the ship



USS Constitution in dry-dock during restoration/maintenance

Navy Terminology (continued)

Applying ship terminology to buildings is common at the Washington Navy Yard (WNY) and the Pentagon. “Carderock site employees checked in at the Quarterdeck this morning.”

Quarterdeck – Receptionist desk and area

Decks – Floors in a building

Head – Bathroom

Passageways or P-ways – Hallways

Bulkheads – Walls



Washington Navy Yard

Navy Terminology (continued)

Aboard ships, signals are sent to one another as letters and/or numbers, which have meanings by themselves or in certain combinations. In the Allied Signals Book, “BZ” or “Bravo Zulu” means “Well Done”

Phonetic Alphabet

Alpha	November
Bravo	Oscar
Charlie	Papa
Delta	Quebec
Echo	Romeo
Foxtrot	Sierra
Golf	Tango
Hotel	Uniform
India	Victor
Juliet	Whiskey
Kilo	X-Ray
Lima	Yankee
Mike	Zulu



Riding a Ship

You may visit a ship in order to see the technology or system on which you are working. Always remember the Ship is the Sailor's home, and you are a guest. Observe and respect the Navy's customs and courtesies, and always conduct yourself in a professional manner.

All NSWCCD employees planning to ride a ship will undergo shipboard training to learn the etiquette, safety, and procedures aboard ship.



Manning the Rails - A form of salute or honor; in this case, celebrating return to port

Change of Command Ceremony

- The formal passing of responsibility, authority, and accountability of command from one officer to another
- Rich in naval tradition and quite formal
- The relieving orders are read and the outgoing Commanding Officer has the opportunity to say goodbye. The new Commanding Officer reads the order of assignment to command and officially “reports for duty”
- Generally happens about every 3 years at NSWC Carderock.



Daily Honoring of the Colors

- Colors are honored every day at 0800 and sunset
- If you observe that this ceremony is about to begin, follow these guidelines:
 - If driving, pull over and wait for the ceremony to conclude
 - If walking, stop, face the direction of the flag or music, and cover your heart with your right hand until the ceremony is concluded
 - Meetings scheduled at Carderock at 0800 may start a few minutes late to accommodate those who were outside.



Ceremonial Honoring of the Colors at Events

- A Color Guard will move forward with the Flags to present to all people present
- All present rise and face the Color Guard
- The National Anthem is played
- At this time, all military members salute while the music plays
- All civilians remove their hats, if applicable, and place their right hand over their hearts



The Flag may be referred to as: “The Flag”,
“The Colors”, “The Standard” or
“The National Ensign”



Recognition by the CO or Technical Director

Navy employees may receive recognition from Carderock's leadership or another military activity for a job well-done.



- A formal letter of recognition may be sent
- A formal awarding of honor or recognition in the correct venue may take place, e.g.:
 - A department technical award
 - A NSWCCD award at the annual award ceremony

Veterans' Employee Resource Group

If you are interested in learning more about the Carderock's Veterans Employee Resource Group (VERG), please reach out to one of the following personnel:

- lawrence.j.pugliese.civ@us.navy.mil
- laurel.l.martin2.civ@us.navy.mil
- bethann.flannery.civ@us.navy.mil

VERG Events:

- Memorial & Veterans' Day Observance
- Toys for Tots
- Monthly Brown Bags – highlight a topic
 - Benefits – education, discounts, etc.
 - Military Buy-Back

In Closing...

These are just some of the interesting facets of Navy and Military protocol.

For more information on Navy Protocol, you can research several Navy and commercial websites.

Here are a few suggestions:

Official Site of the United States Navy – www.navy.mil

Official website of the Department of Defense – www.defense.gov

Naval History and Heritage Command – www.history.navy.mil

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division

AMERICA'S FLEET STARTS HERE



Command Evaluation And Review Office

Captain Todd E. Hutchison
Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Code 00N

Larry Tarasek
Technical Director, NSWCCD

Staffing:

- John R. Wilson, CERO Head/Investigator
- Duc Cang, Auditor/Investigator
- Vacant, Investigator
- Vacant, Investigatpr



NSWCCD Instruction 5000.1D

- Command Evaluation and Review Program
- CER is meant to provide the Commanding Officer (CO) with an independent, in-house assessment designed to assist in improving mission accomplishment, integrity of command and economical use of resources. command or activity operations. The CE Program is a staff function that reports directly to the CO.

Programmatic Functions:

1. Hotline Program (Fraud, Waste, Abuse & Mismanagement)

- Serves as the focal point for FWA matters, including overall program coordination.
- Conducts investigations and inquiries of internal/ external hotline allegations.
- If appropriate, refers fraudulent cases to Naval Criminal Investigative Service

2. Command Directed Investigations (CDIs)

- Conducts Judge Advocate General, Management Inquiries, Preliminary Inquiries, and other Command-level Investigations as directed by the Commanding Officer

3. Evaluations/Reviews (Annual Plan)

- Conducts periodic and special reviews, evaluations, studies and analyses of command or activity operations.
- Provides an independent, in-house capability to detect deficiencies, improprieties or inefficiencies.
- Provides recommendations to correct conditions which adversely impact mission accomplishment, command integrity, or efficient use of resources.



4. Audit Liaison/Follow-up

- Serves as Division liaison, and provides logistical and administrative support for the GAO, NAVAUDSVC, DOD IG, NAVINSGEN, and other audit organizations.
- Maintains a central depository of audit reports and audit responses to findings and recommendations.

Matters Appropriate for the Inspector General's Hotline

- * Abuse of Title/Position
- * Bribes/Kickbacks/Acceptance of Gratuities
- * Conflicts of Interests
- * Ethics Violations
- * False Official Statements/Claims
- * Fraud
- * Gifts (Improper receipt or giving)
- * Improper Referral for Mental Health Evaluations
- * Mismanagement/Organ. Oversight (Significant Cases)
- * Misuse of Official Time, Gov't Property, Position and Public Office
- * Political Activities
- * Purchase Card Abuse
- * Reprisal (Military Whistleblower Protection)
- * Safety/Public Health (Substantial/Specific)
- * Systemic Problems
- * Time and Attendance (Significant Violations)
- * Travel Card Abuse/Travel Fraud
- * Waste (Gross)



QUESTIONS?

REMEMBER THE HOTLINE NUMBER: (301) 227-4228

Visit our Intranet Site:

<https://cuthill.aw3s.navy.mil/intra/ig/>

NSWCCD FWA Complaint Hotline –

How to File a Complaint:

https://cuthill.aw3s.navy.mil/intra/ig/how_to_file.html

NAVSEA Hotline Number: 1-800-356-8464

NAVSEA Hotline Email: NSSC_NAVSEAIGHotline@navy.mil

lunch

Lunch

Return 1200



Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division

AMERICA'S FLEET STARTS HERE



NSWCCD Initial Security Orientation Brief

Captain Todd E. Hutchison
Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Code 1053

Larry Tarasek
Technical Director, NSWCCD



‘Activities undertaken to ensure that people have the skills, knowledge, and information to enable quality performance of security functions and responsibilities, understand security program policies and requirements, and maintain continued awareness of security requirements and intelligence threats.’



Security Mission

The **protection** of U.S. Government assets including **people, property**, and both classified and controlled unclassified **information** is the **responsibility of each and every member** of the Department of Navy (DON), regardless of how it was obtained or what form it takes. Our vigilance is imperative. Anyone with access to these resources has an **obligation to protect them**.




Objectives

- Identify each functional areas and responsibilities of security
- Provide a basic understanding of DOD security policies



Security Division (Code 105)



- Security SMEs
- Supervisors
- Field Detachments
- Contractor



Code 105 Office Hours

- **Main Hours**
 - 0730-1530
- **Classified Mail Handling/Document Control**
 - 0730 – 1100
 - 1200 – 1500
 - FedEx Drop Offs
 - NLT Noon, prior day
 - Last day/time for pick up Thursday/0900



Personnel Security



Security Clearances

- Employment with the NSWCCD requires you to maintain eligibility for access to classified information
- Completed Electronic Questionnaires for Investigation Processing (e-QIP) system
- Access to classified information will be authorized at the level necessary to perform your duties

Eligibility for Access to Classified Material is a privilege, not a right.




Your Security Clearance

- Position sensitivity and/or duties will determine level of clearance or access
- There are three levels of Security Access Requirements (SAR):
 - Top Secret (TS)
 - Secret (S)
 - Confidential (C)
- You **MUST** coordinate with your Security Manager for all matters concerning security clearance/access!



Security Clearance Process



13 Adjudicative Guidelines

- A - Allegiance to the U. S.
- B - Foreign Influence
- C - Foreign Preference

ALLEGIANCE ISSUES

- D - Sexual Behavior
- E - Personal Conduct
- F - Financial Considerations

CHARACTER ISSUES

- G - Alcohol Consumption
- H - Drug Involvement & Substance Abuse
- I - Psychological Conditions

HEALTH ISSUES

- J - Criminal Conduct
- K - Handling Protected Information
- L - Outside Activities
- M - Use of Information Technology

BEHAVIOR ISSUES



Access Eligibility Process

Eligibility Determination

Administrative action, usually involving a form of background investigation and adjudication determination for trustworthiness



SF 312

Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement:
All persons authorized access to classified information are required to sign a SF 312, a legal contractual agreement between you and the U.S. Government.



Need-to-Know

Determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to perform a lawful and authorized government function.



Access

The ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified information.

Continuous Evaluation Program

Employees must recognize and avoid behaviors that might jeopardize their security clearance.

In accordance with NSWCCD Policy Statement for Continuous Evaluation Program, dated 22 FEB 17: individuals are required to report to their supervisor or appropriate security personnel and seek assistance for any incident or situation that could affect their continued eligibility for access to classified information. Individuals shall be initially and periodically briefed thereafter, to ensure familiarity with pertinent security regulations and the standards of conduct required of individuals holding positions of trust.

*****The ultimate responsibility for maintaining eligibility to access classified information rests on YOU!*****



Self-Reporting

Self-reporting is mandatory and emphasizes personal integrity

With this privilege comes the obligation to report certain activities

Foreign Travel



Foreign Contacts



Marriage/Divorce



Alcohol Abuse



Drug Use



Bankruptcy/ Credit Issues



Incarceration/ Arrest



Foreign Allegiance



Loss/Compromise of Classified Info



*Foreign Influence

**Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence (FOCI) concerns*



Classified Information Non-Disclosure



SF-312, Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement

- Full Name
- SSN
- Signature
- Witness
- Debriefing
- Lifetime

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT	
AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN	AND THE UNITED STATES
<small>(Name of Individual - Printed or Typed)</small>	
<p>1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted access to classified information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is marked or unmarked classified information, including oral communications, that is classified under the standards of Executive Order 13526, or under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security; and unclassified information that meets the standards for classification and is in the process of a classification determination as provided in sections 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4(e) of Executive Order 13526, or under any other Executive order or statute that requires protection for such information in the interest of national security. I understand and accept that by being granted access to classified information, special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United States Government.</p> <p>2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified information, including the procedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information have been approved for access to it, and that I understand these procedures.</p> <p>3. I have been advised that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge classified information to anyone unless: (a) I have officially verified that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it, or (b) I have been given prior written notice of authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) responsible for the classification of information or last granted me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I understand that if I am uncertain about the classification status of information, I am required to confirm from an authorized official that the information is unclassified before I may disclose it, except to a person as provided in (a) or (b), above. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.</p> <p>4. I have been advised that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security clearances I hold; removal from any position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances; or termination of my employment or other relationships with the Departments or Agencies that granted my security clearance or clearances. In addition, I have been advised that any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a violation, or violations, of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of sections 641, 793, 794, 798, 1062 and 1024, title 18, United States Code, "the provisions of section 783(b), title 50, United States Code, and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1962. I recognize that nothing in this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.</p> <p>5. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted, will result or may result from any disclosure, publication, or revelation of classified information not consistent with the terms of this Agreement.</p> <p>6. I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement including, but not limited to, application for a court order prohibiting disclosure of information in breach of this Agreement.</p> <p>7. I understand that all classified information to which I have access or may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law. I agree that I shall return all classified materials which have, or may come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of such access: (a) upon demand by an authorized representative of the United States Government; (b) upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship with the Department or Agency that last granted me a security clearance or that provided me access to classified information; or (c) upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship that requires access to classified information, if I do not return such materials upon request. I understand that this may be a violation of sections 793 and/or 1924, title 18, United States Code, a United States criminal law.</p> <p>8. Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized representative of the United States Government, I understand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this Agreement apply during the time I am granted access to classified information, and at all times thereafter.</p> <p>9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should find any provision of this Agreement to be unenforceable, all other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.</p> <p>10. These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to (1) classified information, (2) communications to Congress, (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.</p>	
<small>(Continue on reverse.)</small>	
<small>NAV 1540-1-200-0409 Previous edition not usable.</small>	<small>STANDARD FORM 312 (Rev. 7-2013) Prescribed by OIG 32 CFR PART 2001.80 E.O. 13526</small>

FRONT

11. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by Executive Order No. 13526 (76 Fed. Reg. 707), or any successor thereto section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b) (8) of title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1999 (governing disclosure of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1962 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents); sections 7(c) and 8(f) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) (relating to disclosures to an Inspector General, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, and Congress); section 1024(h)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(h)(3)) (relating to disclosures to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community); sections 17(i)(5) and 17(e)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g(i)(5) and 403g(e)(3)) (relating to disclosures to the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency and Congress); and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including sections 641, 793, 794, 798, 1062 and 1024 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4 (b) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.

12. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any, have been answered. I acknowledge that the briefing officer has made available to me the Executive Order and statutes referenced in this agreement and its implementing regulation (32 CFR Part 2001 - section 2001.80(e)(2)) so that I may read them at this time, if I so choose.

*NOT APPLICABLE TO NON-GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT.

SIGNATURE	DATE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (See Notice below)
ORGANIZATION (IF CONTRACTOR, LICENSEE, GRANTEE OR AGENT, PROVIDE NAME, ADDRESS, AND, IF APPLICABLE, FEDERAL SUPPLY CODE NUMBER) (Type or print)		

WITNESS	ACCEPTANCE
THE EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT WAS WITNESSED BY THE UNDERSIGNED.	THE UNDERSIGNED ACCEPTED THIS AGREEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
DATE	DATE
NAME AND ADDRESS (Type or print)	

SECURITY DEBRIEFING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I reaffirm that the provisions of the espionage laws, other federal criminal laws and executive orders applicable to the safeguarding of classified information have been made available to me, that I have returned all classified information in my custody, that I will not communicate or transmit classified information to any unauthorized person or organization, that I will promptly report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation any attempt by an unauthorized person to solicit classified information, and that I (have) (have not) (strike out inappropriate word or words) received a security debriefing.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	DATE
NAME OF WITNESS (Type or print)	
SIGNATURE OF WITNESS	DATE

NOTICE: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal agencies inform individuals, at the time information is solicited from them, whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what authority such information is solicited, and what uses will be made of the information. You are hereby advised that authority for soliciting your Social Security Number (SSN) is Public Law 104-194 (April 26, 1996). Your SSN will be used to identify you precisely when it is necessary to verify that you have access to the information indicated above or to determine that your access to the information indicated has been terminated. Furnishing your Social Security Number, as well as other data, is voluntary, but failure to do so may delay or prevent you being granted access to classified information.

STANDARD FORM 312 BACK (Rev. 7-2013)

BACK

NOTE: Contractors Only - fill out organization information



Information Security



Information Security

The protection of classified and controlled unclassified information (CUI), including but not limited to:

- Marking
- Handling
- Transmission
- Storage
- Destruction



Information Categories

■ Classified Information

- **TOP SECRET (TS)** (Exceptionally Grave Damage)
- **SECRET (S)** (Serious Damage)
- **CONFIDENTIAL (C)** (Damage)

■ Controlled Unclassified Information

- For Official Use Only (FOUO) [FOIA exemptions 2-9]
- Distribution Controlled
- Personal Identifiable Information (PII)
- Privacy Act Information
- Proprietary Information (ownership belongs to Contractor)



Safeguarding Classified Information

Cover Sheets

SF 703 - Top Secret (orange)

SF 704 - Secret (red)

SF 705 - Confidential (blue)



Labels

SF-706 - Top Secret (orange)

SF-707 - Secret (red)

SF-708 - Confidential (blue)

SF-709 - Classified (purple)

SF-710 - Unclassified (green)



Types of Classified Materials

Classified Material can include **ANY** of these and must be properly marked:



Machinery, Documents
Emails, Models, Faxes
Photographs, Reproductions
Storage Media, Working Papers, Meeting
Notes, Sketches, Maps, Products,
Substances,
or Materials



How Information Is Classified?

■ Original Classification

- Initial classification decision
- Original Classification Authority (OCA)
 - Designated in writing by SECNAV (for Top Secret) and DUSN (Policy) (for Secret)
 - **NOTE: Commanding Officer, NSWC Carderock Division IS NOT an OCA**

■ Derivative Classification

- Incorporating, paraphrasing, restating, or generating, in new form, information that is already classified
- **Training is mandatory (every two years)**
- Derivative sources:
 - Security Classification Guide (SCG)
 - Properly marked source documents (e.g., books, pamphlets, etc.)
 - DD Form 254, DoD Contract Security Classification Specification



Classified Information Source Lines

ORIGINAL CLASSIFIER

Classified By: John Smith, Director

Reason: 1.4(c)

Declassify On: 20551231

DERIVATIVE CLASSIFIER

Classified By: Sue Jones, Code 453

Derived From: PMO Ships SCG

Declassify On: 20551231



Handling Classified Information

Must be:

- Under positive control by an authorized person and/or stored in an approved GSA container, vault, or secure room
- Discussed only in authorized areas and/or processed via authorized systems/equipment (e.g., STE, SIPRNet, JWICS)
- Protect/safeguard with appropriate cover sheet
- Properly marked
- Must have a courier card when hand carrying
- Secured/protected when found unattended



Storing Classified Information

■ Classified Information Must Be:

- In a GSA Approved Container/Secure Room/Vault when not being used

■ DO NOT:

- Leave classified material unattended
- Leave classified material in desk drawers
- Leave classified material in open security containers



*****DO NOT TAKE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL HOME*****

Destruction of Classified Information


- Must be destroyed in device approved for classified material destruction*
- Approved shredders are located throughout the Command
- Shredders will contain a certification memo
- Other classified media – Contact Security (227-1408)
- All NNPI must be destroyed via approved methods*
- All purchases of classified information destruction devices must be coordinated through Security (Code 105)

**Destruction device must be listed on a current NSA Evaluated Products List (EPL)*



Destruction of Classified Information

- Burning
- Shredding*
- Pulverizing*
- Disintegrating*
- Degaussing*
- Pulping
- Melting
- Chemical Decomposition
- Mutilation



**NSA/CSS Evaluated Products List (EPL)*



Incident Categories Defined

Willful

Negligent

Inadvertent

- An incident is **willful** if the person purposefully disregards DoD security or information safeguarding policies or requirements (e.g., intentionally bypassing a known security control).
- An incident is **negligent** if the person acted unreasonably in causing the spillage or unauthorized disclosure (e.g., a careless lack of attention to detail, or reckless disregard for proper procedures).
- An incident is **inadvertent** if the person did not know, and had no reasonable basis to know, that the security violation or unauthorized disclosure was occurring (e.g., the person reasonably relied on improper markings).

Per DEPSECDEF memo of 14 Aug 2014, Subject: Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information or Controlled Unclassified Information on DoD Information Systems



Types of Security Incidents

- **Violations** - Any knowing, willful or negligent action that could reasonably be expected to result in an unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

Examples include:

- Open/unattended security containers
- Discussing classified information in an unsecure setting
- Processing classified information on unclassified systems

(Note: The presence of classified information on the NMCI NIPRNET is always considered a Security Violation).

[Electronic Spillage]

- **Infractions** - Any knowing, willful or negligent action contrary to the requirements of an order or its implementing directives that do not constitute a 'violation', as defined above. Examples include:

- Failure to use a cover sheet
- Not using a security container checklist
- Not using open/closed sign on a security container



Physical Security



Protection and Prevention

The two primary purposes of physical security are **PREVENTION** and **PROTECTION**. Properly designed and executed physical security programs should deter or prevent to the greatest degree possible the loss, theft, or damage to an asset.

Protection of:

- Resources
- Facilities
- Classified Information
- Operations

Prevention from:

- Theft
- Unauthorized Access
- Loss
- Compromise



Physical Security

Physical security functions offer security-in-depth, and include, but are not limited to:

- Perimeter fences
- Employee and visitor access controls
- Badges/Common Access Cards (CAC)
- Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
- Random guard patrols
- Prohibited item controls
- Entry/Exit inspections
- Visitor escorts
- CCTV monitoring



Storing Classified Information

- Custodian responsibilities
- Container maintenance
- Combo changes
- SF-700, Security Container Info
- SF-701, End of Day Checklist
- SF-702, Security Container Checklist

GSA



Security Container



Secure Room



Vault

SF 700 Security Container Information

- Initiate a combination change when an employee no longer requires access, if there is a compromise, and/or when a container is placed in/out of service.
- Fill out page one and place in an opaque envelope
 - Lists after-hours custodian contact information (PII)
 - Place sealed envelop in control drawer of security container
 - Page two lists combo, place in sealed envelope and provide to Security Office

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECURITY CONTAINER INFORMATION INSTRUCTIONS		1. AREA OR POST (if required)	2. BUILDING (if required)	3. ROOM NO.
1. Complete Part 1 and Part 2A (on end of flap). 2. Detach Part 1 and attach to the inside of the control drawer of the security container. 3. Mark Parts 2 and 2A with the highest classification level stored in this security container. 4. Detach Part 2A, insert in envelope (Part 2) and seal. 5. See Privacy Act Statement on reverse.		NSWCCD	42	104
		4. ACTIVITY (Division, Branch, Section or Office)	5. CONTAINER NO.	
		Code 1051	1046SF	
		6. MFG. & CLASS OF CONTAINER	7. MFG. & LOCK MODEL	8. SERIAL NO. OF LOCK
		Mosier	X-07	N/A
9. DATE COMBINATION CHANGED	10. PRINT NAME/ORGANIZATION SYMBOL WITH SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING CHANGE			
05/29/2018	Matthew Stubblefield Code 1051 <i>Matthew Stubblefield</i>			
11. Immediately notify one of the following persons, if this container is found open and unattended.				
EMPLOYEE NAME		HOME ADDRESS		HOME PHONE
Matthew Stubblefield		Complete Address		Complete phone number
Timothy Willingham		Complete Address		Complete phone number

1. ATTACH TO INSIDE OF SECURITY CONTAINER

700-102
NSN 7540-01-214-5372

STANDARD FORM 700 (REV. 4-01)
Prescribed by NARA/ISOO
32 CFR 2003



Security Containers and Secure Rooms

- SF 702-Security Container Check Sheet
 - Posted on outside of container or door
 - Every day must be accounted for including weekends and holidays
 - Completed form retained for 90 days from last entry



SECURITY CONTAINER CHECK SHEET							
FROM	ROOM NO.	BUILDING	CONTAINER NO.				
	151	55	HV-321				
CERTIFICATION							
I CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT I HAVE OPENED, CLOSED OR CHECKED THIS SECURITY CONTAINER IN ACCORDANCE WITH PERTINENT AGENCY REGULATIONS AND OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS.							
MONTH/YEAR							
May 2017							
DATE	OPENED BY		CLOSED BY		CHECKED BY		GUARD CHECK (if required)
	INITIALS	TIME	INITIALS	TIME	INITIALS	TIME	INITIALS TIME
1	MJS	0600	MJS	0830	MJS	1600	
2	MJS	0630	MJS	0800			
	MJS	1000	MJS	1400	MJS	1600	
3	MJS	0630	MJS	0830			
	MJS	1100	MJS	1130			
	MJS	1500	MJS	1530	HJP	1600	
4	NOT OPENED				MJS	1600	
5	MJS	0600	MJS	1400	HJP	1600	
6	WEEKEND						
7	WEEKEND						
8	MJS	0700	MJS	1200	HJP	1600	
9	MJS	0730	MJS	1500	HJP	1600	
10	MJS	0530	MJS	0700			
	MJS	0900	MJS	1100			
	MJS	1200	MJS	1300			
	MJS	1330	MJS	1500	MJS	1500	
11	TDY						
12	TDY						
13	TDY						
14	TDY						
15	MJS	0600	MJS	1500	MJS	1500	
16	NOT OPENED				MJS	1600	



End-of-Day Security Checks

- SF 701-Activity Security Checklist
 - Posted on inside of room, closest to exit
 - Annotate weekends and holidays
 - Completed form retained for 90 days from last day

ACTIVITY SECURITY CHECKLIST		DIVISION BRANCH OFFICE Code 99 (Bldg. 55)													ROOM NUMBER 151		MONTH AND YEAR May 2017															
Irregularities discovered will be promptly reported to the designated Security Office for corrective action.		Statement																														
		I have conducted a security inspection of this work area and checked all the items listed below.																														
TO (if required)		FROM (if required)													THROUGH (if required)																	
*ITEM	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
1. Security container	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		
2. Windows secure	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		
3. Alarms set	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		
4. Interior office doors locked	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		
5. Coffee pot unplugged	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		
6.																																
7.																																
8.																																
INITIAL FOR DAILY REPORT																																
TIME	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600			1600	1600	1600	1600	1600			1600	1600	1600	1600	1600			1600	1600	1600	1600	1600			1600	1600		



Access

- Base Access:
 - Common Access Card (CAC)
 - Authorized pass
 - Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS)
 - Credentialing for contractors, vendors, and suppliers requiring recurring access
 - Not required for contractors with CAC
 - All contractors (w/o a CAC), vendors and delivery personnel are required to complete and sign the SECNAV Form 5512/1
 - Credentials require a sponsor



Prohibited Items

These items and those similar in nature are **prohibited** inside NSWCCD Office Spaces

* Photography



Alcohol



Drugs



Sexually Explicit
Material



Weapons
(Guns/Knives)

* Permission Required



Cell Phones and PED Policy

- **Personally-owned cell phones are prohibited in:**
 - Restricted Areas
 - Open Storage Areas
 - Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF)
 - Explosive operations buildings and storage areas
- **CUI**
 - NAVSEA and Carderock PED Policies in place
 - NAVSEA Update, May 2016: "In such spaces [basic office spaces], sound judgment is required prior to conducting discussions. Although PEDs are authorized in these locations, each employee is responsible to ensure that controlled information is not inadvertently exposed to unauthorized personnel and recording of any kind is prohibited."




Industrial Security



Industrial Security

- A **partnership** between the federal gov't and industry in order **to safeguard classified information**
- Establishes standards for contracting companies who have access to classified information
- Prevents unauthorized disclosure of classified by:
 - Defining requirements
 - Identifying restrictions
 - Establishing safeguards



- Prior to disclosing classified information:
 - Determine if contractor requires access in connection with a legitimate U. S. Government requirement
 - Contract Solicitation
 - Pre-contract Negotiation
 - Contractual Relationship
 - IR&D Effort
 - Determination based on:
 - Facility clearance valid for access at same or lower classification level as FCL
 - Storage capability

DD Form 254

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SPECIFICATION <i>(The requirements of the DoD Industrial Security Manual apply to all security aspects of this effort.)</i>		1. CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING	
		a. FACILITY CLEARANCE REQUIRED	
		b. LEVEL OF SAFEGUARDING REQUIRED	
2. THIS SPECIFICATION IS FOR: <i>(X and complete as applicable)</i>		3. THIS SPECIFICATION IS: <i>(X and complete as applicable)</i>	
a. PRIME CONTRACT NUMBER		a. ORIGINAL <i>(Complete date in all cases)</i>	DATE <i>(YYYYMMDD)</i>
b. SUBCONTRACT NUMBER		b. REVISED <i>(Supersedes all previous specs)</i>	REVISION NO.
			DATE <i>(YYYYMMDD)</i>
c. SOLICITATION OR OTHER NUMBER	DUE DATE <i>(YYYYMMDD)</i>	c. FINAL <i>(Complete item 6 in all cases)</i>	DATE <i>(YYYYMMDD)</i>
4. IS THIS A FOLLOW-ON CONTRACT? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO. If Yes, complete the following: Classified material received or generated under _____ <i>(Preceding Contract Number)</i> is transferred to this follow-on contract.			
5. IS THIS A FINAL DD FORM 254? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO. If Yes, complete the following: In response to the contractor's request dated _____, retention of the classified material is authorized for the period of _____.			
6. CONTRACTOR <i>(Include Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) Code)</i>			
a. NAME, ADDRESS, AND ZIP CODE		b. CAGE CODE	c. COGNIZANT SECURITY OFFICE <i>(Name, Address, and Zip Code)</i>
7. SUBCONTRACTOR			
a. NAME, ADDRESS, AND ZIP CODE		b. CAGE CODE	c. COGNIZANT SECURITY OFFICE <i>(Name, Address, and Zip Code)</i>
8. ACTUAL PERFORMANCE			
a. LOCATION		b. CAGE CODE	c. COGNIZANT SECURITY OFFICE <i>(Name, Address, and Zip Code)</i>
9. GENERAL IDENTIFICATION OF THIS PROCUREMENT			
10. CONTRACTOR WILL REQUIRE ACCESS TO:			
a. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC) INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	11. IN PERFORMING THIS CONTRACT, THE CONTRACTOR WILL:	
b. RESTRICTED DATA	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. HAVE ACCESS TO U.S. CLASSIFIED INFORMATION <i>(OUTSIDE THE U.S. PERTAINING TO U.S. POSSESSIONS AND TRUST TERRITORIES)</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
c. CRITICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGN INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. RECEIVE CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ONLY	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
d. FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> 3. RECEIVE AND GENERATE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
e. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> 4. FABRICATE, MODIFY, OR STORE CLASSIFIED HARDWARE	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
(1) Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> 5. PERFORM SERVICES ONLY	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
(2) Non-SCI	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> 6. HAVE ACCESS TO U.S. CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OUTSIDE THE U.S. PERTAINING TO U.S. POSSESSIONS AND TRUST TERRITORIES	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
f. SPECIAL ACCESS INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> 7. BE AUTHORIZED TO USE THE SERVICES OF DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER (DTIC) OR OTHER SECONDARY DISTRIBUTION CENTER	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
g. NATO INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> 8. REQUIRE A COMSEC ACCOUNT	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
h. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> 9. HAVE TEMPEST REQUIREMENTS	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
i. LIMITED DISSEMINATION INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> 10. HAVE OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) REQUIREMENTS	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
j. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> 11. BE AUTHORIZED TO USE THE DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
k. OTHER <i>(Specify)</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> 12. OTHER <i>(Specify)</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO

DD FORM 254, DEC 1999

PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.

Reset Adobe Professional 7.0

12. PUBLIC RELEASE. Any information (classified or unclassified) pertaining to this contract shall not be released for public dissemination except as provided by the Industrial Security Manual or unless it has been approved for public release by appropriate U.S. Government authority. Proposed public releases shall be submitted for approval prior to release Direct Through *(Specify)*

to the Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for review. In the case of non-DoD User Agencies, requests for disclosure shall be submitted to that agency.

13. SECURITY GUIDANCE. The security classification guidance needed for this classified effort is identified below. If any difficulty is encountered in applying this guidance or if any other contributing factor indicates a need for changes in this guidance, the contractor is authorized and encouraged to provide recommended changes; to challenge the guidance or the classification assigned to any information or material furnished or generated under this contract; and to submit any questions for interpretation of this guidance to the official identified below. Pending final decision, the information involved shall be handled and protected at the highest level of classification assigned or recommended. *(Fill in as appropriate for the classified effort. Attach, or forward under separate correspondence, any documents/guides/extracts referenced herein. Add additional pages as needed to provide complete guidance.)*

14. ADDITIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. Requirements, in addition to ISM requirements, are established for this contract. Yes No
(If Yes, identify the pertinent contractual clauses in the contract document itself, or provide an appropriate statement which identifies the additional requirements. Provide a copy of the requirements to the cognizant security office. Use item 13 if additional space is needed.)

15. INSPECTIONS. Elements of this contract are outside the inspection responsibility of the cognizant security office. Yes No
(If Yes, explain and identify specific areas or elements carved out and the activity responsible for inspections. Use item 13 if additional space is needed.)

16. CERTIFICATION AND SIGNATURE. Security requirements stated herein are complete and adequate for safeguarding the classified information to be released or generated under this classified effort. All questions shall be referred to the official named below.

a. TYPED NAME OF CERTIFYING OFFICIAL	b. TITLE	c. TELEPHONE <i>(include Area Code)</i>
d. ADDRESS <i>(include Zip Code)</i>		

17. REQUIRED DISTRIBUTION

<input type="checkbox"/>	a. CONTRACTOR
<input type="checkbox"/>	b. SUBCONTRACTOR
<input type="checkbox"/>	c. COGNIZANT SECURITY OFFICE FOR PRIME AND SUBCONTRACTOR
<input type="checkbox"/>	d. U.S. ACTIVITY RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERSEAS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	e. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICER
<input type="checkbox"/>	f. OTHERS AS NECESSARY

DD FORM 254 (BACK), DEC 1999

Reset



Other General Security Tasks



Other Key Processes

- Base Access for Visitors
- Hosting Foreign Visitors
- Foreign Travel Process



NSWCCD Visitors

- Major events (e.g., sub races, STEM competition)
 - Visitors are required to complete and sign the SECNAV Form 5512/1
 - Form 5512/1 must be submitted five (5) days prior to visit
- Classified Meetings or other official visits
 - Carderock employee notifies Security Office of visitor
 - Initiate coordination at least 10 days prior to visit
- Upon arrival Visitor must provide name of POC



Hosting Foreign Visitors

■ Official Visits

- Must be processed/approved via Foreign Visit System (FVS)
- Security Division notifies Code sponsor and NCIS (Contact Officer)
- Three types: One time; Recurring; Extended
- Coordinate with NAVSEA HQ if DDL required
- If authorized, visitor can have access to classified information

■ Unofficial Visits

- Courtesy calls, general visits, public events, etc.
- Hosting code submits CARDEROCKDIV 5512/6
- Security Division will coordinate with host code and Visitor Center
- No access to classified information is authorized



Foreign Travel

All personnel traveling outside of U.S. on official duty or on leisure must:

- Submit a CARDERDIV Form 5540/1 at least 30 days prior to departure
- Submit a CARDERDIV Form 5540/2 within 3 business days of return to duty

Pre-travel guidance is provided in the Foreign Clearance Guide (<https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil>)

This process ensures the Foreign Travel Brief is given to personnel who require them. The briefs increase awareness regarding:

- Personal Safety
- Potential targeting
- Travel warnings and alerts
- Where to seek assistance



ALL personnel MUST check-in and check-out with the Security Division (Code 105)

- Receive Security Briefings/Debriefings
- Turn in badges, credentials, CACs, ID Cards, etc.
- Receive/Return Courier Cards
- Update JPAS records
- Ensure ALL classified information assigned to you is transferred to the appropriate program/person before check-out
- **Security (Code 105), Bldg. 42 should be the final stop, on the last duty day, before departing the installation.**

Summary



Summary


Why are we here?



Ana
Montes




Edward
Snowden



Jerry
Whitworth



Aldrich
Ames



Robert
Hanssen



Bradley
Manning

The importance of security awareness and vigilance on the part of all employees cannot be overemphasized. It helps to detect internal and external threats and vulnerabilities ultimately assisting in preventing security breaches. It is only when all employees are vigilant and aware, that those who disregard security policies and procedures can be identified before causing irreparable damage to national security.



Security Is...


- » You
- » Me
- » Us
- » We

....a Team effort.

....and Everyone's Responsibility



Questions



Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division

AMERICA'S FLEET STARTS HERE



Controlled Unclassified Information

Captain Todd E. Hutchison
Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Code 1053

Larry Tarasek
Technical Director, NSWCCD



Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)

Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) is information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls pursuant to and consistent with applicable **Law, Regulations, and Government-Wide Policies (LRGWP)** but is not classified under Executive Order 13526 or the Atomic Energy Act, as amended.



Note: The originator of a document is responsible for determining, at origination, whether the information may qualify for CUI status, and if so, for applying the appropriate CUI markings.



- Executive Order 13556, Controlled Unclassified Information
- 32 CFR Part 2002, Controlled Unclassified Information
- DoDI 5200.48, Controlled Unclassified Information

Categories of CUI

Category	Description
Agriculture	Agricultural operation, farming or conservation practices, or the actual land.
Controlled Technical Information*	Information with military or space application that is subject to controls on the access, use, reproduction, modification, performance, display, release, disclosure, or dissemination.
Copyright	A form of protection provided by the laws of the United States (17 USC) to the authors of "original works of authorship."
Critical Infrastructure*	The most vital systems and assets (whether physical or virtual), whose incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the nation's security, economy, and/or public safety.
Emergency Management	Information concerning the continuity of executive branch operations during all-hazards emergencies or other situations that may disrupt normal operations.
Export Control*	Unclassified information concerning certain items, commodities, technology, software, or other information whose export could reasonably be expected to adversely affect the United States national security and nonproliferation objectives.
Financial*	Related to the duties, transactions, or otherwise falling under the purview of financial institutions or United States Government fiscal functions.
Foreign Government Information*	Information provided by, otherwise made available by, or produced in cooperation with, a foreign government or international organization.
Geodetic Product Information	Related to imagery, imagery intelligence, or geospatial information.
Immigration	Related to admission of non-US citizens into the United States and applications for temporary and permanent residency.



Categories of CUI (cont.)

Category	Description
Information Systems Vulnerability Information	Related to information that if not protected, could result in adverse effects to information systems.
Intelligence	Related to intelligence activities, sources, or methods.
Law Enforcement	Related to techniques and procedures for law enforcement operations, investigations, prosecutions, or enforcement actions.
Legal	Information related to proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial settings.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	Related to information generated by NATO member countries under the North Atlantic Treaty international agreement, signed on April 4, 1949.
Nuclear*	Related to protection of information concerning nuclear reactors, materials, or security.
Patent	Patent is a property right granted by the Government of the United States of America to an inventor "to exclude others profiting off of or benefiting from the patent owner's property."
Privacy	Personal information, or, in some cases, "personally identifiable information," as defined in OMB M-07-16, or "means of identification" as defined in 18 USC 1028(d)(7).
Proprietary Business Information*	Material and information relating to, or associated with, a company's products, business, or activities; data or statements; trade secrets; product R&D; and performance specifications, etc.
SAFETY Act Information	The regulations implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002.



Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

- Informs the public of information while appropriately protecting government interests.
- Provides individuals with access to many types of records that are exempt from access under the Privacy Act of 1974.

Dissemination controls are applied for information that may be withheld from the public if disclosure would reasonably be expected to cause a foreseeable harm to an interest protected under Exemptions 2 through 9 of the FOIA.

*****Promotes transparency AND accountability*****



FOIA Exemptions

Number	Description
Exemption 2	Information that pertains solely to the internal rules and practices of the agency that, if released, would allow circumvention of an agency rule, policy, or statute, thereby impeding the agency in the conduct of its mission.
Exemption 3	Information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding. The language of the statute must clearly state that the information will not be disclosed.
Exemption 4	Information such as trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a company on a privileged or confidential basis that, if released, would result in competitive harm to the company.
Exemption 5	Inter- or intra-agency memorandums or letters containing information considered privileged in civil litigation. (Examples: decision making processes and attorney-client privilege.)
Exemption 6	Information, the release of which would reasonably be expected to constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of individuals.
Exemption 7	Records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes that: (a) Could reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings. (b) Would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication. (c) Could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others. (d) Disclose the identity of a confidential source. (e) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures. (f) Could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.
Exemption 8	Certain records of agencies responsible for supervision of financial institutions.
Exemption 9	Geological and geophysical information (including maps) concerning wells.



Marking CUI

We are in the “crawl” phase of a “crawl, walk, run” implementation plan as we await further guidance from Big Navy. For now:

- Mark CUI documents/emails with the banner marking of “(CUI)” at the top and bottom of the page/email.
- Paragraph/portion markings are currently optional in this crawl phase, but if used, portion mark “(CUI)” for titles, sections, paragraphs, etc.
 - If portion marks are used, then all CUI and Unclassified portions of the document must contain portion markings.
- Include a “CUI Designation Indicator” on the bottom right side of the first page/cover of the document, above the CUI footer banner. Example:
 - Controlled by: Department of the Navy (always this for now)
 - Controlled by: NSWCCD Code 105 (agency/office/code making the determination)
 - CUI Category: OPSEC, PHYS (from the DoD CUI Registry @ <https://www.dodcui.mil>)
 - Distribution/Dissemination Control: FEDCON (Distribution statements B-F or other LDCs)
 - POC: John Doe, john.doe@navy.mil, 301-555-5555 (originator/authorized CUI holder)




Legacy Markings

CUI may have been previously marked with old legacy/ad hoc markings that will no longer be used. They include, but are not limited to:

- “For Official Use Only” or “FOUO”
 - “Sensitive But Unclassified” or “SBU”
 - “Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information” or “UCNI”
 - “Law Enforcement Sensitive”, “LES”
 - “Limited Distribution” or “LIMDIS”
- Effective 15 April 2021, FOUO and other legacy markings have been phased out. Mark all new documents and emails containing CUI with “CUI” at the header and footer (top and bottom).
- Existing legacy documents do not need to be remarked at this time, as long as they remain under DoD control or are accessed online/downloaded for use within the DoD.



CUI Marking Examples



Digitally sign and encrypt

CUI ← Banner Header

1. This is an example of how to mark CUI emails as of 15 Apr 21.
2. All emails containing CUI must be marked with CUI at the top and bottom of the email.
3. Portion markings are optional at this time.
4. All emails containing CUI must be digitally signed and encrypted.

V/R,

Vicky Davis
Security Specialist, Code 105
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division
9500 MacArthur Blvd, West Bethesda MD 20817
Office: 301-227-1408

Designation Indicator

Controlled by: Department of the Navy
Controlled by: OJAG Code 13
CUI Category: PRVCY
Distribution/Dissemination Control: FEDCON
POC: CDR Jane Doe, jane.doe@navy.mil, 703-555-5555

CUI ← Banner Footer

Marking CUI Documents as of 15 Apr 2021

CUI

This is an example of how documents containing CUI will be marked as of 15 Apr 2021. Only the header and footer will contain "CUI". Portion markings are not required at this time.

Controlled by: Department of the Navy
Controlled by: NSWCCD Security Division 1051
CUI Category: PRVCY
Distribution/Dissemination Control: FEDCON
POC: CDR Jane Doe, jane.doe@navy.mil, 703-555-5555

CUI

FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY



Distribution Controls

“Statements intended to facilitate control, secondary distribution, and release of these documents without the need to repeatedly obtain approval or authorization from the controlling DoD office.”

- For use on technical documents (not admin or general correspondence)
- Wording of the distribution statements may not be modified to specify additional distribution
- Documents containing export-controlled data shall be marked with applicable export-control statement



Distribution Statement “Reasons”

- Public Release
- Administrative or Operational Use
- Contractor Performance Evaluation
- Critical Technology
- Export Controlled
- Foreign Government Information
- Operations Security
- Premature Dissemination
- Proprietary Information
- Test and Evaluation
- Direct Military Support
- Software Documentation
- Specific Authority
- Vulnerability Information



Distribution Statements

- **Distribution Statements on Technical Documents** - All newly created, revised, or previously unmarked classified and unclassified DoD technical documents shall be assigned one of the following distribution statements:
 - A: Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited
 - B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't agencies only
 - C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't agencies & their contractors
 - D: Distribution authorized to DoD & U.S. DoD contractors only
 - E: Distribution authorized to DoD Components only
 - F: Further distribution as directed by the Controlling Authority
 - X: Use of Distro X is superseded [Convert to Distro C, w/ Export Control]
- **Distribution Control:**
 - Document authors/Controlling DoD Agency Reps are responsible for initial distribution control determinations/reasons. **YOU are the SME!**
 - Distribution statements shall remain in effect until changed or removed by the controlling office. Removal of or tampering with control markings by unauthorized personnel is strictly prohibited.




Safeguarding

- Encrypt all e-mails containing CUI
- Do not e-mail CUI to commercial accounts (Yahoo, Gmail, Hotmail, etc.)
- Do not post CUI on public websites or social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)
- Obtain review/approval prior to public release
- Use First Class Mail; Fax; Parcel Post
- Use purple SF 901 cover sheet and DD Form 2923 for PII



CUI Cover Sheets



CUI
ATTENTION

Use this space to indicate categories, limited dissemination controls, special instructions, points of contact, etc., if needed. (OPTIONAL)
Visit <https://www.archives.gov/cui> for correct marking information.

Controlled by:
CUI Category(ies):
LDC or Distribution Statement(s):
POC:

ATTENTION


All individuals handling this information are required to protect it from unauthorized disclosure.


Handling, storage, reproduction, and disposition of the attached document(s) must be in accordance with 32 CFR Part 2002 and applicable agency policy.

Access to and dissemination of Controlled Unclassified Information shall be allowed as necessary and permissible to any individual(s), organization(s), or grouping(s) of users, provided such access or dissemination is consistent with or in furtherance of a Lawful Government Purpose and in a manner consistent with applicable law, regulations, and Government-wide policies.

CUI

SF 901



 **Privacy Act Data Cover Sheet**

To be used on all documents containing personal information

DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED ARE SUBJECT TO THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

Contents shall not be disclosed, discussed, or shared with individuals unless they have a direct need-to-know in the performance of their official duties. Deliver this/these document(s) directly to the intended recipient. **DO NOT** drop off with a third-party.

The enclosed document(s) may contain personal or privileged information and should be treated as "For Official Use Only." Unauthorized disclosure of this information may result in **CIVIL** and **CRIMINAL** penalties. If you are not the intended recipient or believe that you have received this document(s) in error, do not copy, disseminate or otherwise use the information and contact the owner/creator or your Privacy Act officer regarding the document(s).

Privacy Act Data Cover Sheet

DD FORM 2923, SEP 2010

DD Form 2923



Storage

- During working hours - minimize the risk of access by unauthorized personnel through eavesdropping or observing CUI on:
 - Desks
 - Printers/faxes
 - Other publicly accessible areas, commute/travel status
- After working hours - if space provides security for continuous monitoring (i.e. Open Storage Areas), store in:
 - unlocked containers, desks, cabinets, etc.
- For spaces without adequate monitoring, store in:
 - locked desks, file cabinets, bookcases, rooms, or similarly secured areas



Lawful Government Purpose

Defined as any activity, mission, function, operation, or endeavor that the Government authorizes or recognizes as within the scope of its legal authorities or the legal authorities of non-executive branch entities (such as state and local law enforcement).

Similar to the concept of need-to-know for national security classified information.

YOU are the authorized holder of CUI and YOU determine someone's lawful government purpose!



Destruction

- Any means approved for classified material
- Cross-cut shredder
- Gray shred bins
- CUI must be:
 - Unreadable
 - Indecipherable
 - Irrecoverable

Note: Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (NNPI) (classified or unclassified) must be destroyed in the same manner as classified information.



Our Adversaries Are Relentless



“U.S. Says Iran Hacked Navy Computers” – Wall Street Journal 2013



“Chinese Hackers Pursue Key Data on U.S. Workers” – New York Times 2014



“Data Breach at Anthem May Forecast a Trend” – New York Times 2015



“Hack of Adultery Site...Exposed Military Emails” – Military.com 2015




“Equifax’s Hacking Nightmare Gets Even Worse for Victims” – Bloomberg 2017




“Twitter Confirms ‘Nation-State’ Attack: User Identities Breached” – Forbes 2020



Questions?





Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division

AMERICA'S FLEET STARTS HERE



Personally Identifiable Information

Captain Todd E. Hutchison
Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Code 1053

Larry Tarasek
Technical Director, NSWCCD

“Information about an individual that identifies, links, relates, or is unique to, or describes him or her, e.g., a SSN; age; rank; grade; marital status; race; salary; home/office phone numbers; other demographic, biometric, personnel, medical and financial information.”



What is PII?

Information about an individual that identifies, links, relates, or is unique to, or describes the individual which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity.

“High risk” (Sensitive) PII: may cause harm to an individual if lost/ compromised:

- Financial information- bank account #, credit card #, bank routing #
- Medical Data- diagnoses, treatment, medical history
- Full or truncated Social Security number
- Place and Date of Birth
- Mother’s maiden name
- Passport #

“Low risk” (Non-sensitive) PII: business related PII; releasable under FOIA or authorized use under DON policy:

- Job Title
- Pay grade
- Office phone number
- Office address
- Office email address *
- Full Name
- DoD ID/EDIPI
- DoD Benefits number

* Cautionary note: Growing problems with email phishing



PII Guidance and Resources

- DoD 5400.11-R, DOD Privacy Program
- SECNAVINST 5211.5E, DON Privacy Program
- NAVSEAINST 5211.2A, NAVSEA Privacy Act – PII Program
- CARDEROCKDIVINST 5211.1B, NSWCCD Privacy Program
- DoDI 5200.48, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)
- NAVADMIN 125/10, Safeguarding Personally Identifiable Information
- DON MSG DTG 081745Z NOV 12, DON Fax Policy
- Dept. of the Navy Chief Information Officer (CIO) website:
<http://www.doncio.navy.mil/Main.aspx>



Privacy Act of 1974

The Privacy Act governs the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally identifiable information about individuals that is maintained in systems of records by federal agencies.

A System of Records (SOR) is a group of records under the control of an agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifier assigned to the individual, such as an SSN.

No agency shall disclose any record that is contained in a SOR by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains.



System of Records Notice (SORN)

- A notice of all SOR under DoD control and retrievable by a personal identifier
- Must list authority for soliciting Privacy Act (PA) information
- Published by DoD in the Federal Registry
- Must include a 'Routine Use' Disclosure
- Can be deleted, altered or amended
- Must be reviewed annually
- Posted to Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Division web site at [http://dpcl.d.defense.gov/ Privacy/SORNs/](http://dpcl.d.defense.gov/Privacy/SORNs/)



PII is a sub-category of CUI


- **Encrypt all e-mails containing CUI**
- **Do not e-mail CUI to personal e-mail accounts (Yahoo, Gmail, Hotmail, etc.)**
- **Do not post CUI on public websites/servers (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)**
- **Use SF 901 cover sheet or DD Form 2923 for PII**
- **Apply “lawful government purpose” principle (similar to need-to-know)**
- **Properly label and safeguard information**

Your Responsibilities

- Complete mandatory PII training – via TWMS
- Safeguard/protect PII in accordance with PII collection procedures
 - Apply the “lawful government purpose” principle (similar to need-to-know)
 - Do not collect PII without an authorized SORN or maintain an unpublished SOR
 - Obtain a reasonable verification of identity when a request to access PII is made
 - Use SF 901 Cover Sheets
- Report violations and misuse
 - Contact your supervisor or PII coordinator to report violations and/or misuse of PII



CUI/PII Marking Examples



CUI ← Banner Header

1. This is an example of how to mark CUI emails as of 15 Apr 21.
2. All emails containing CUI must be marked with CUI at the top and bottom of the email.
3. Portion markings are optional at this time.
4. All emails containing CUI must be digitally signed and encrypted.

V/R,

Vicky Davis
Security Specialist, Code 105
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division
9500 MacArthur Blvd, West Bethesda MD 20817
Office: 301-227-1408

CUI ← Banner Footer

Designation Indicator

Controlled by: Department of the Navy
Controlled by: OJAG Code 13
CUI Category: PRVCY
Distribution/Dissemination Control: FEDCON
POC: CDR Jane Doe, jane.doe@navy.mil, 703-555-5555



**ONE DOES NOT SIMPLY SEND AN EMAIL
CONTAINING PII**




WITHOUT ENCRYPTING IT

PII Breach

Breach: Actual or possible loss of control, unauthorized disclosure, or unauthorized access of personal information where persons other than authorized users gain access or potential access to such information for an other than authorized purposes where one or more individuals will be adversely affected.

Breach Prevention:


- Complete annual mandatory PII training
- Follow Collections, Maintenance, and Use Policies
- Safeguard/Protect Information
 - Limit Access
 - Proper Transmittal (encrypt emails)
 - Use Coversheets
 - Proper Disposal
- Report violations and/or misuse to Privacy Coordinator



DD Form 2923




DON PII Breach Reporting Process



Primary Cause....

- Human error causes 80% of PII breaches

- Not knowing guidance
- Failure to follow established guidance
- Carelessness



**The most commonly reported PII breach is the failure to encrypt emails.
The most commonly breached element of PII is SSNs.**

Faxes and PII

- Faxing is one of the least secure means to transmit data
 - Uses non-secure phone lines
 - Easy to send to wrong person/wrong FAX number
 - Copy of transmission often left on machine
 - Recipient may not immediately pick up document, exposing PII to others without a need-to-know

- Alternative Methods to Faxing
 - Send encrypted/digitally signed email
 - Use Safe Access File Exchange (SAFE)
 - Use United States Postal Service



Helpful Links

- **Encrypting Email Containing PII:**
<http://www.doncio.navy.mil/ContentView.aspx?ID=3989>
- **Rules for Handling PII by DON Contractor Support Personnel:**
<http://www.doncio.navy.mil/ContentView.aspx?ID=2145>
- **PII and Records Management:**
<http://www.doncio.navy.mil/ContentView.aspx?ID=1415>
- **Safeguarding PII on the Command Shared Drive:**
<http://www.doncio.navy.mil/contentview.aspx?id=755>



PII Triangle

Lawful Government Purpose

Does the person have a “lawful government purpose” (similar to need-to-know)? If not, do not forward or grant access.

Safeguard

Encrypt ALL CUI/PII emails.

Mark CUI on headers/footers.

Use DD Form 2923 cover sheet.

Non-Sensitive PII (No safeguarding required)

- Office phone #
- Work cell phone #
- Work address
- Federal employee salary info
- Office rosters including lists of employee codes

Division PII Coordinator

Ryan Mathsen

ryan.mathsen@navy.mil

301-227-2085

CARDEROCKDIVINST 5211.1B

NAVSEAINST 5211.2B

SECNAVINST 5211.5E

Sensitive PII (Safeguard)

- SSN
- DOB
- Place of Birth
- Medical Info
- Home Address
- Home Phone #
- Personal Cell Phone #


Destruction


Cross-cut shredders or Grey shred bins are the only authorized means for CUI/PII destruction.

** Never discard PII in a trash can, recycle bin, or dumpster. **



Questions?





Contact Information

Vicky Davis

Security Office (Code 1051)

Building 42, Room 104

301-227-1408

vicky.davis@navy.mil

You, Me, Us, We

Security is a TEAM effort!

Break 2

Break 2



Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division

AMERICA'S FLEET STARTS HERE



Operations Security (OPSEC) Brief

Captain Todd E. Hutchison
Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Code 105

Larry Tarasek
Technical Director, NSWCCD

Overview

- History
- Definition & Perspective
- Oversight Guidance
- OPSEC & Traditional Security
- Five-Step Process
- OPSEC In-Depth
- OPSEC and the Internet
- TRASHINT
- OPSEC and Public Release
- Miscellaneous



History and Origins of OPSEC

- Developed during the Vietnam War
- Study/analysis of how the enemy gained advance knowledge of combat air operations
- Established a methodology of looking at friendly ops from an adversary prospective
- The effort was code named – Purple Dragon
- Conceived processes to negate/reduce friendly indicators observable by the enemy
- Methodology was termed ‘Operations Security’
- National program formally established in 1988



The Purple Dragon

- National Security Decision Directive 298, “National Operations Security Program”

Each Executive Department and Agency assigned or supporting national security missions with classified or sensitive activities shall establish a formal OPSEC program ...

NSDD 298

**National Operations
Security Program**

22 January 1988

-- signed by President Ronald Reagan

OPSEC Defined


A systematic and proven process by which the U.S. Government and its supporting contractors can **deny** to potential adversaries **information** about capabilities and intentions by **identifying**, **controlling**, and **protecting** generally **unclassified** evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive Government activities.

- National Security Decision Directive 298




DoD Directive 5205.02E

- “Applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ U.S. Armed Forces during war, crisis, or peace.”
- “Including activities involving **research, development, test and evaluation; DoD contracting; treaty verification; nonproliferation protocols; international agreements; force protection; and the release of information to the public.**”




SECNAVINST 3070.2

- Establishes policy, procedures, and responsibilities for the Department of the Navy OPSEC program.
- The Secretariat, USN, and USMC shall maintain effective OPSEC programs that ensure coordination between public affairs, cybersecurity, security, operations, acquisition, intelligence, training , and command authorities and include mechanisms for enforcement , accountability, threat awareness, and oversight.
- OPSEC is to be incorporated into all operations and activities.




OPNAVINST 3432.1

- Directs Echelon II level commands (i.e., NAVSEA), possessing critical information, to establish formal OPSEC programs
- “Essential secrecy will be maintained by naval forces thru use of OPSEC measures..... **OPSEC measures will be applied to research and system development, testing evaluation, and acquisition programs.....**”
- Echelon II level commanders can delegate, to subordinate elements (Carderock), OPSEC program establishment requirements




NAVSEAINST 3432.1A

- Directs establishment of OPSEC programs at designated NAVSEA field activities (i.e., Carderock). Delegates responsibility for NAVSEA OPSEC to the Director, Office of Security Programs and Planning
- Applies to all NAVSEA personnel (DoD civilians, military, and on-site contractors)
- “Establish and implement OPSEC policies, procedures, processes and guidance to enable the cost effective protection of NAVSEA critical information, people, technology, essential functions, and equipment.”




- Directs division commander to establish a Carderock Division OPSEC program and designate a division OPSEC PM (delegated to Security Branch – 105)
- Applies to all departments and offices of Carderock Division
- Supplements OPSEC concepts, policies, and procedures of DON and NAVSEA



Relationship to Traditional Security


- Security programs protect **CLASSIFIED** information.
 - Personnel Security
 - INFOSEC
 - Industrial Security
 - Physical Security
- OPSEC measures identify, control, and protect generally **UNCLASSIFIED** (critical) information associated with sensitive operations and activities.
- OPSEC is a **COUNTERMEASURES** program.



OPSEC does not replace traditional security disciplines — it STRENGTHENS them.

OPSEC 5-Step Process

- Identify Critical Information
- Analyze the Threat
- Determine Vulnerabilities
- Risk Assessment
- Develop / Apply Countermeasures



OPSEC's most important characteristic is that it is a process that can be applied to any operation or activity.

What is Critical Information?

- Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities
- Probably unclassified, but still sensitive
- Two or three bits of critical information aggregated together may result in a sensitive disclosure



Data aggregation becomes the puzzle pieces revealing the 'big picture'

The information that is often used against us is not classified; it is information that is openly available to anyone who knows where to look and what to ask.

Critical Information

- Command Critical Information List (CIL) and Code specific CIL are posted on intranet
- CO's OPSEC Policy Memo stresses importance of protecting critical information
- Review CIL Cue Cards posted at all desks/workstations

CRITICAL INFORMATION CUE CARD



Critical Information is specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. Because it's normally UNCLASSIFIED, critical information that is an adversary's target of choice.

Seemingly harmless pieces of UNCLASSIFIED information, when combined, can result in an aggregation of sensitive or classified information. Personnel should employ proper Operations Security (OPSEC) procedures to protect critical information.

PROTECT AND SAFEGUARD:

- Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) such as FOUO, Security Classification Guide (SCG) contents
- Details of plans, programs, operations, test events, exercises, contract awards, designs & milestones before approved for public release
- System/facility vulnerabilities and weaknesses or similar information
- Reference of mission associated information such as personnel/equipment deployment dates/locations
- Privacy Act/Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
- Association of nicknames or code words with programs, projects, or locations

Properly destroy (i.e., shred) hardcopy documents which may reveal CUI or critical information. Encrypt emails that may contain or reveal CUI or critical information.

Implementing OPSEC at work and home enables mission success by reducing adversary options to collect critical information or personal information. Become a hard target! For more information contact the NSWCDD Security Division at 301-227-1861/1408.

March 2017



Analyze the Threat

“The capability of an adversary coupled with the intention to undertake any actions detrimental to the success of program activities or operations.”

- Nation states
- Insiders
- Criminal elements
- Terrorists
- Narcotics traffickers

<i>Threat Actors</i>	<i>Motive</i>	<i>Targets</i>	<i>Means</i>	<i>Resources</i>
<i>Nation States During War Time</i>	Political	Military, intelligence, infrastructure, espionage, reconnaissance, influence operations, world orders	Intelligence, military, broad private sector	Fully mobilized, multi-spectrum
<i>Nation States During Peace Time</i>	Political	Espionage, reconnaissance, influence operations, world orders	Intelligence, military, leverages criminal enterprises or black markets	High, multi-spectrum, variable skill sets below major cyber powers
<i>Terrorists, Insurgents</i>	Political	Infrastructure, extortion	Leverage black markets?	Limited, low expertise
<i>Political Activists or Parties</i>	Political	Political outcomes	Outsourcing?	Limited, low expertise
<i>Black Markets For Cyber Crime</i>	Financial	Hijacked resources, fraud, theft, IP theft, illicit content, scams, crime for hire	Tools, exploits, platforms, data, expertise, planning	Mobilizes cyber crime networks
<i>Criminal Enterprises</i>	Financial		Reconnaissance, planning, diverse expertise	Professional, low end multi-spectrum, leverage of black markets
<i>Small Scale Criminals</i>	Financial		Leverages black markets	Low, mostly reliant on black markets
<i>Rogue Enterprises</i>	Financial	IP theft, influence on sectoral issues	Outsourcing to criminal enterprises?	Sectorial expertise, funding, organization

Threat Actors and Capabilities


Threat = Capability + Intent



Vulnerabilities

‘Weaknesses which are susceptible to exploitation by adversaries. A vulnerability exists when the adversary is capable of collecting an OPSEC indicator, correctly analyzing it, and then taking timely action.’

- Observation of friendly actions
- Open source research
- Poor security processes
- Lack of education and training
- Complacency / predictability



Vulnerability + Threat = Risk

‘Friendly actions and open sources of information that can be detected or interpreted by adversarial intelligence systems.’

- Signatures – make indicators identifiable and stand out
- Associations – relationships to other information or activities
- Profiles - sum of multiple signatures (patterns)
- Contrasts - established pattern vs. current observations
- Exposure – duration and time an indicator can be observed

Allows the adversary to identify our critical information

Risk Assessment

- Risk management, not risk avoidance
- **Threat** + No Vulnerability = No Risk
- No Threat + **Vulnerability** = No Risk
- ***Threat + Vulnerability = Risk***
- Justify the cost of losing information vs. the cost of implementing countermeasures

Risk is the likelihood of an undesirable event occurring and the consequences of that event.



Apply Countermeasures

- Prevent detection of critical information
- Provide an alternative association of critical information
- Deny the adversary's collection system
- Implement new, more stringent procedural actions

\$\$\$ - Cost is the biggest factor in implementing specific countermeasures



Basic Countermeasures

- All Paper, Notes, Printouts etc.– **NAVSEA Shred Policy**
- Sensitive/classified e-mails – **Encryption or use SIPRNET**
- Phone Calls – **STE**
- Sensitive/classified info documents – **SIPR/Secure Fax**
- DO NOT **“TALK AROUND”** Sensitive Information on Non-Secure Voice Circuits
- No **“Pillow Talk”** (guard what’s shared with significant others)
- No **“Shop Talk”** in restaurants, bars, public areas

The best countermeasure is to adhere to established security procedures



OPSEC and the Internet

- Recovered al Qaida training manual states:
 - “Using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least **80%** of information about the enemy”
- DoD Website Admin Policy - review data for sensitivity before posting to publicly accessible websites (www.defenselink.mil/webmasters)
- OPSEC policy requirement to conduct periodic web site reviews/research for presence of sensitive information

Policy requirement for OPSEC PMs to conduct periodic web site reviews/research for presence of sensitive information

Social Networking Sites


- Current problem
- Adhere to SECDEF DoD policy
- Jun 2009 Deputy Director Memo
- Absolutely no expectation of privacy
- Pose a **significant** OPSEC, intelligence, and general security **threat to DON personnel, facilities, and mission**

The Facebook logo, consisting of the word "facebook" in white lowercase letters on a dark blue rectangular background.The Twitter logo, consisting of the word "twitter" in light blue lowercase letters on a white background with a thin blue border.

DON employees are prohibited from posting information about DON personnel, missions, activities, and operations unless it is readily available to the general public AND has been authorized of public release IAW DoD guidance

OPSEC and Official IT Networks

- Technical nature of system passwords warrant added protections
- Don't share passwords with co-workers or unauthorized users
- Risks are information compromise/system degradation
- Sys Admins: Transmit router settings and passwords separately and always encrypt



CTF 1010 MSG, DTG 120537Z AUG 17, Subj: OPSEC Handling of Network Settings and Passwords



Our Adversaries Are Relentless



“Australian defense firm was hacked and F-35 data stolen, DoD confirms” – arstechnica.com, 2017



2018

National Security

China hacked a Navy contractor and secured a trove of highly sensitive data on submarine warfare



THE WARZONE

What Secretive Anti-Ship Missile Did China Hack From The U.S. Navy?

Details surrounding the Navy's Sea Dragon program remain scarce, but there are some distinct possibilities.

BY TYLER ROGOWAY AND JOSEPH TREVITHICK JUNE 8, 2018

- THE WAR ZONE
- ANTI-SHIP MISSILE
- CYBER WARFARE
- ESPIONAGE
- HACK
- HACKED
- HYPERSONIC
- LRASM
- LRASM-B
- NETWORKED
- NUWC RHODE ISLAND
- RATTLRS
- SEA DRAGON
- SM-6
- STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES OFFICE
- SUBMARINE
- TIME-SENSITIVE STRIKE



Dumpster-dives of random refuse collection points

Examples of Critical Information Found

Personally Identifiable Info (PII)

Official e-mails

Funding/resource/budget information

Office Memos

FOUO

Personal banking account numbers

Technical briefings



TRASHINT Countermeasures

- Periodically inspect outgoing trash and recycle containers
- Utilize approved shredders and burn bags
- Securely store sensitive information pending destruction



OPSEC and Public Release

- Official news articles
- Briefing presentations
- Training/informational brochures, pamphlets, etc.
- Manuscripts for books/movies/plays (fiction or non-fiction)
- Personal (unofficial) blogs
- SNS forums
- Ensure applicable time allowance (edits/conflicts)
- Restrictive/Limited Distribution Statements (A-F)

Pre-publication review is mandatory IAW DoDI 5230.29; DEPSECDEF & CJCS JtMmsg DTG 090426Z AUG 06; DoDI 8550.01; and DoD 5205.02-M. Additionally, SF-312, Nondisclosure Agreement.



OPSEC: Capture The Flag



Your Responsibilities

- Ask Yourself --
 - ✓ Is this information important to our adversaries?
 - ✓ Do I care if it is **published on the front page** of the Washington Post?
 - ✓ Will it help an adversary to assemble and form the **overall picture**?
 - ✓ Is this information central to the mission effectiveness of NSWCCD or my office?
 - ✓ What might this “insignificant” information reveal to adversaries about our **intentions** and **capabilities**?
- What will our adversaries learn by watching, listening, and collecting information we “protect?”




OPSEC Summary

- **Identify critical information** to determine if friendly actions can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
- **Determine if information** obtained by adversaries **could be interpreted** to be useful to them.
- **Execute** selected **countermeasures** that eliminate or reduce adversary exploitation of friendly critical information.

OPSEC helps identify the indicators that give away information about missions, activities and operations.




Still Important Today



World War II Era Poster



Still Important Today



Modern Era Poster


Contact Information

**Security Division (Code 105)
Building 42, Room 104
301-227-1861**

Remember...Think OPSEC!!

**Security is Everyone's Responsibility – If You See
Something, Say Something!**





Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division

AMERICA'S FLEET STARTS HERE



NSWCCD Insider Threat Awareness

Captain Todd E. Hutchison
Commanding Officer, NSWCCD

Code 1053

Larry Tarasek
Technical Director, NSWCCD

Training Objectives

- Detecting potential insider threats
- Adversary methodologies of recruitment
- Indicators of potential insider threats
- Reporting requirements

Insider Threat Program

DETER

DETECT

MITIGATE

Threats insiders may pose to DoD and U.S. Government **installations, facilities, personnel, missions, or resources**. This threat can include **damage** to the United States **through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure** of national security information, or through the **loss or degradation** of departmental resources or capabilities.



Insider Threat Awareness

- It's not a career plan
- Various factors can contribute
- Identify and report
- Implement plans/procedures to mitigate risks



Definition

- Insider Threat. A person with authorized access, who uses that access, wittingly or unwittingly, to harm national security interests or national security through unauthorized disclosure, data modification, terrorism, or kinetic actions resulting in loss or degradation of resources or capabilities.



Policy Guidance

- Presidential Memorandum of 21 Nov 2012, National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs
- EO 13587, Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information
- Committee on National Security Systems Directive (CNSSD) No. 504, Directive on Protecting National Security Systems from Insider Threat
- DoDD 5205.16, DoD Insider Threat Program
- DoD 5220.02-M, NISPOM - Change 2
- SECNAVINST 5510.37, DON Insider Threat Program
- NAVSEAINST 5510.21, NAVSEA Insider Threat Program



Potential Motivators

- Feeling of injustice
- Loss of something valuable
- Disregard of a system of protections
- Need to feel important
- Just the thought that the rules don't apply
- Antithetical moral obsession

Any could transform an otherwise trustworthy employee into a disgruntled insider threat



Potential Risk Indicators (PRIs)

- **Ignorance** (lacks awareness of policies/procedures)
- **Complacency** (lax approach to policies/procedures)
- **Malice** (malicious/intentional acts which create risks)

PRIs in Detail

Ignorance

- Unknowingly clicking on a phishing scam
- Attaching passwords to his/her laptop
- Leaving sensitive information on his/her desk unattended
- Discussing sensitive information in a public location
- Failing to adhere to obligations in understanding what is sensitive information and protecting it
- Unknowingly committing security infractions or violations
- Misusing Government IT systems for non-work functions

Complacency

- Using personal storage devices (e.g., phones, laptops, iPads) for conducting official business without authorization
- Uploading sensitive files to a third party site
- Allowing unknown individual inside the door behind him/her without a badge
- Unauthorized absences
- Unreported foreign contacts or travel
- Drug or unauthorized alcohol use in the workplace
- Possessing unauthorized weapon in the workplace

Malice

- Attempting to access information or physical spaces that are not relevant to work assignment
- Stealing sensitive information and sharing it with others or for his/her own gain
- Threatening violence against self or peers
- Expressing ill-will towards Component or other DoD organizations
- Criminal or illegal conduct, actions, or affiliations
- Brandishing a weapon in the workplace



Examples

- Espionage
- Unauthorized Disclosure
- Workplace Violence
- Sabotage
- Security Incidents/Violations
- Unwitting actions that increase vulnerabilities



Security Incidents

- Establishing pattern of security violations
- Seeking to expand access
- Being reluctant to submit to polygraph
- Being responsible for unaccounted for classified materials
- “Fishing” through offices/storage containers in search of classified material

Examples of PRIs related to security incidents



Mishandling of Classified

- Attempts to obscure classification markings
- Unauthorized removal of classification markings
- Classified materials kept at home
- Being responsible for unaccounted for classified materials
- Retention of classified obtained at previous jobs

Examples of PRIs related to mishandling classified materials



- Accessing systems outside of normal work hours
- Repeated deviations from security procedures
- Use of unmarked media to store information
- Unexplained changes in systems/user activity
- Use of multiple passwords/log-ins
- Attempting to obtain/use co-worker passwords
- Accessing restricted files without authorization

Examples of PRIs related to IT systems

Suspicious Behavior

- Working hours inconsistent with job assignment
- Insisting on working in private without a valid reason
- Demonstrating exploitable behavior traits
- Revealing unexplained affluence
- Showing infatuation with covert activity and interest in clandestine operations

Examples of PRIs related to suspicious behavior



Unexplained Affluence

- Sudden purchase of high value items
- Unexplained ready cash
- Unexplained settlement of large outstanding debts
- Large deposits to savings accounts
- Opening of savings or stock accounts with foreign banks

Examples of PRIs related to unexplained affluence



Potential Workplace Violence

- Disgruntlement
- Substandard performance
- Frequent fights with coworkers and supervisors
- Failure to follow regulations and guidelines
- Displays of ill temper and false accusations against others
- Repeated reprimands, disciplinary sanctions

Examples of PRIs related to potential workplace violence




Potential Terrorism

- Associating with others in an affiliated group
- Changes in character, behavior, appearance
- Criminal activity
- Trouble with/keeping employment
- Unexplained affluence
- Strong ideological beliefs
- Long, unexplained absences from locality

Examples of PRIs related to potential terrorism



Affects of Life Events/Crisis



Opportunity and crisis can contribute to a vulnerability



Reporting

- Supervisors
- Security element
- Law Enforcement
- Military Department CI Organization(e.g., NCIS)
- FBI




Failure to Report

- Military: Punitive action under Article 92 (UCMJ)
- Civilians: Appropriate disciplinary action under policies governing civilian employees
- Contractors: DoD 5220.22-M, NISPOM



Real Life Examples



Ben-ami Kadish
[US Army civilian employee]
Pled guilty to acting as
unregistered agent of
foreign power. (Dec 08)
[Israel]



Reality Winner
[NSA Translator]
Leaked information
about Russian hacks.
Plead guilty to
espionage, sentenced to
5 years (Jun 18)



Chi Mak
[DoD contractor]
Conspiracy and other
violations. Sentenced
to 24 years. (May 07)
[China]



Stewart Nozette
[Scientist]
Plead guilty to
espionage, sentenced
to 13 years. (Mar 12)
[FBI sting operation]



Wen Chyu Liu
[Research Scientist]
60 months prison, \$25k
fine and forfeiture of
\$600k. Trade secret
theft. (Jan 12)
[China]



Jin Hanjuan
[Software Engineer]
Sentenced to four years
in prison. Trade secret
theft. (Aug 12)
[China]



James Michael Wells
[USCG civilian employee]
Four consecutive life
sentences and restitution
of \$1.5 M. Workplace
violence. (Apr 12)



Bryan Martin
[USN enlisted sailor]
Pled guilty to 11
espionage charges.
Sentenced to 48 years.
(May 11)
[FBI sting operation]



Other, high profile cases



Bradley Manning – Unauthorized disclosure to WikiLeaks

Major Nidal Hassan – Responsible for shooting at Fort Hood Texas



Edward Snowden – Unauthorized disclosure of NSA surveillance programs



Aaron Alexis – Responsible for shooting at the Washington Navy Yard




Conclusion

Through implementation of a proactive and effective Insider Threat program, the Navy can minimize, or eventually, eliminate the unauthorized compromise or theft of National Security Information or head off the next destructive act that would target Navy personnel. A fully operational and effective Navy is critical to meet our National Security needs as we move into the future. Stopping the malicious insider, both witting and unwitting, will go a long way to ensuring the future effectiveness of the United States Navy.

Insider Threat should be every employee's concern!



Questions



Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division

AMERICA'S FLEET STARTS HERE



Unauthorized Commitments (UACs)

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Code 0212

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What is an UAC?

- **An agreement made by a government representative who lacks the authority to obligate or commit appropriated funds on behalf of the Government, thus making the agreement non-binding (Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR] 1.602-3).**
- **Any person lacking the proper authority who deliberately or unintentionally authorizes a supplier to provide goods or services to the Government creates an unauthorized commitment. The responsible individual may be held personally and financially liable for said commitment.**
- **A request for ratification must "establish whether the unauthorized commitment meets the ratification requirements set forth in." [FAR 1.602-3]**

Summarizing the previous slide.....

A UAC is an agreement that is not binding solely because the government representative who made it lacked the authority to enter into that agreement on behalf of the government

Personnel OTHER than Contracting Officers and Purchase Card Holders lack authority to bind the government!

A ratification request must establish whether the UCA meets the requirements for ratification as set forth in FAR 1.602-3.

Examples of UACs

A training class was scheduled and held BUT the cardholder had not paid for the class prior to personnel attending the first day of the class.

An unauthorized government employee requested locksmith services from a contractor knowing a contract was NOT in place and promised future payment.

A subject matter expert or Contracting Officer's representative (COR) directed a contractor to perform out-of-scope work on a contract.

Examples of UACs (cont.)

A subject matter expert or Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) directed a contractor to perform additional tasking after the contractor had expended all the funding provided on the contract.

Personnel sent equipment to be inspected to the vendor before the vendor received authorization to perform the inspection via a contract or purchase card buy. The equipment was sent with a shipping form clearly stating a \$500 inspection fee. The contractor performed the inspection upon receipt of the equipment.

Scenario 1:

- **Question:** A Federal employee with purchase card authority of up to \$3,500 enters into a contract with a hotel for a meeting space that costs \$4,300.
- **Answer:** This is an UAC! => Reason: Total cost of the meeting space exceeds the cardholder's authority.

Scenarios (cont.)

Scenario 2:

- **Q:** The program office has a contract for 20 working printers. One of the printers jams frequently and a new printer has been delivered as a replacement. The contractor is told to leave the old printer in place, because it still works.
- **A:** This is an UAC! => Reason: Contractor provided more than he/she is under contract to provide. Since the contract only permits 20 printers, the old printer should be removed when the replacement was delivered. The person interacting with the contractor should contact the Contracting Officer or COR and allow them to provide instructions to the contractor.

Scenarios (cont.)

Scenario 3:

- Q:** A supplier mistakes a request for information for an order and subsequently ships an item.
- A:** This is NOT an UAC as long as: The person that received the item does NOT accept (or use) the delivered item. The person who receives the item should notify the Contracting Officer or COR and the vendor that mistakenly shipped the item.
- BEWARE:** If a vendor emails a software update/license or subscription renewal to an employee BEFORE the vendor receives the contract, and the user downloads the update or renewal, this IS a UAC because the user downloaded the update, indicating it was accepted before it was authorized by a Contracting Officer/Purchase Card Holder.

UAC Statistics at Carderock

- FY 20: 0 actions ratified
2 actions resolved into a non-reportable status,
with **one paid by the unauthorized individual**
- FY 19: 3 ratified actions
- FY 18: 1 ratified action
- FY 17:
 - 4 actions ratified
 - 5 actions resolved into a non-reportable status => **3 actions being paid by the unauthorized individual**



Impacts of UACs

UACs must be ratified by a Contracting Officer, thus taking priority over other work that needs to be performed.

All UACs are reported to NAVSEA, and if NAVSEA has received more than seven (7), NAVSEA is required to report the UAC to ASN.

All UAC's over \$50,000 and for repeat offenders must be approved at SEA00.

If NOT ratified, you are personally responsible to pay.

Even if ratified, you still may be subjected to disciplinary action.

Severe damage to government-contractor relationship



POC for UACs

If you need more information or have questions regarding unauthorized commitments, please contact our Policy Branch at Code02_Policy.fct@navy.mil.



Questions?



Partners



Wrap up

(Questions/Evaluations)